

MA Thesis
China Foreign Affairs University

The Italian Communist Party and its relationship with the USSR and the CCP (1956-1966)

MA Thesis
Submitted to the Department of International Relations
for the Double degree between LUISS and CFAU

Major: comparative history

Focus: the Italian Communist Party

Supervisor: Prof. Lin Minwang

Writer: Adriana Lori

May, 2015

*To my mother,
always by my side.*

ABSTRACT

This work is an analysis of the international communist crisis in the length of time 1956-1966 with a particular focus on how the Italian Communist Party looked at the Chinese counterpart during the Sino-Soviet tension.

Great relevance is given to the major events that took place in those years and to the consequences they brought about both at the international and national level.

This work is divided in five chapters. The first one deals with the most important events that took place in 1956, the starting point of this research, so that the reader can have a comprehensive understanding of the international situation. The second chapter probes the main reasons and main consequences of the international communist crisis. The third one investigates the length of time 1961-1963. The main focus of the fourth chapter is the relationship between the Chinese issue and the Euro communist project. At last, the fifth chapter will provide an insight on the PCI strategic decisions following the death of Togliatti, *the best man*.

This work is a comparative historical descriptive analysis of the three communist parties aforementioned: the PCI, the CCP and the USSR. The main purpose is to show the reasons of the Italian detachment from the USSR and its perception of the actions carried out by the Chinese communist party.

CONTENT

ABBREVIATION

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND

- 1.1 The international scenario**
 - 1.2 The Italian Communist Party**
 - 1.3 The XX Congress of the CPUS**
 - 1.4 China and the URSS: mounting tensions**
-

CHAPTER II: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CRISIS

- 2.1 Reasons of the International Communist Crisis**
 - 2.1.1 Hungarian crisis**
 - 2.1.2 A new player in the international scenario**
 - 2.1.3 The situation of socialist parties in capitalistic countries**
 - 2.1.4 The process of destalinization**
 - 2.2 The consequences**
 - 2.2.1 Identity crisis**
 - 2.2.2 Tension between the USSR and China and the mounting risk of a split**
 - 2.3 Togliatti and the crisis of the International Communist Movement**
 - 2.3.1 Following the XX Congress**
 - 2.3.2 The failure of the *policentrismo* project**
 - 2.3.3 The weakening of the Italian Communist Party**
 - 2.4 Preliminary conclusions**
-

CHAPTER III: THE YEARS 1961-63

- 3.1 International events**
 - 3.1.1 The report of the CC of the PCI on the XXII Congress of the USSR**

3.2 The PCI towards the other parties

3.3 The divergences between Togliatti and the other communists

3.3.1 On peace and war

3.3.2 The use of nuclear arms

3.3.3 The imperialists and conservative as cartoon tigers

3.3.4 On the peaceful coexistence

3.3.5 The pacific and democratic path towards socialism

3.3.6 On the Yugoslav revisionist group

3.3.7 On Marxism-Leninism itself

3.4 The international situation within the communist movement

3.5 Togliatti's reply to the Chinese critique

3.6 Preliminary conclusions

CHAPTER IV: THE CHINESE ISSUE AND THE EURO COMMUNISM

4.1 Tense relationship with the Chinese Communist Party: the possible outcome

4.2 The Euro Communist dream: the PCI, the PCF and their understanding of international communism

4.3 The PCI and the increasing divergence with the USSR

4.4 Togliatti commenting on the Sino-Soviet debate

4.5 Explaining the methodological reason of the divergence between the PCI and the PCC

4.6 The Italian delegation in Moscow

4.7 Deepening the explanation of the Italian flexible approach towards the Chinese

4.8 The Yalta Memoir

4.9 Preliminary conclusions

CHAPTER V: THE PCI FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF THE BEST MAN

5.1 The international scenario

5.2 The bequest of the Yalta Memoir

5.3 The new internationalism

5.4 Longo's leadership

5.4.1 The relationship with the Chinese

5.4.2 The international contacts of the PCI

5.4.3 The PCI and Moscow

5.4.4 The PCI towards the Vietnam question

5.5 Berlinguer and its different approach

5.6 Preliminary conclusions

CONCLUSION

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

REFERENCES

ABBREVIATION

CC: Central Committee

CCP: Chinese Communist Party

CPSU: Communist Party of the Soviet Union

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PCI: Partito Comunista Italiano

PRC: People's Republic of China

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION

My research question regards a comparative analysis between the Italian and the Chinese communist parties between 1956 and 1966. In particular, I will focus on how the Italian Communist Party looked at the People's Republic of China and at the CPUS during this period of time.

This research question is important for two reasons:

1. **Contribution to the field.** The historical perspective of the Cold War has often reduced the Italian communism to *Stalinism*, thwarting the chance to understand the evolution within it. It is only after 1989, thanks to the *Fondazione Istituto Gramsci*, that some documents were released, clarifying some of the international political goals of the Italian communist party. What is striking is that several studies have limited their research to the national perspective or at most, they have enlarged it to the European dimension. My research will provide new and useful insights to the present literature.

2. **Contribution in materials.** The dissertation uses plenty of new materials that have been recently disclosed. Indeed, many materials were not available to past researchers. All of this will be useful in order to reconstruct the relationship between the two parties.

My Argument

The point at hand is that the PCI has always been understood according to the dynamics of the Cold War. What is striking is that several studies have limited their research to the national perspective or at most, have enlarged it to encompass the European dimension. My goal is to overcome this narrow European perspective. This will be carried out by highlighting the fact that, on the one hand, the PCI has always been in line with the Soviet Union. However, on the other one, it has also called for *policentrismo* and inter-dependence among all the communist parties.

Methodology

The methodology that I used is based upon the analysis of first sources, especially the documents from the *Fondazione Istituto Gramsci*. I went through a careful reading of the core documents of the direction between the 1956 and 1966. A large amount of documents drafted by the Secretary has been taken into account too. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that only since 1962 there is a specific section on the Italian Communist Party's foreign policy.

Moreover, I have probed many documents available through the website Cold War International history, thanks to which I have been able to read translated versions of both Chinese and Soviet documents.

Speaking about secondary sources, I carried out a selection of the leading scholars in the field of both international communism and Italian communist history.

Outline of the thesis

This thesis is divided in five chapters. Following a brief introduction of the most important events that took place in 1956, in the second chapter, I analyse the crisis of the international communist movement and its consequences both at international and national level.

The third and the fourth chapters represent the core of this research wherein it is unfolded in a detail way the relationship of the Italian Communist Party with the Chinese one especially over the matter of the Sino-Soviet tension and of the Euro communism project.

The fifth and last chapter starts off with an analysis of the power struggle within the Italian Communist Party following the death of its leader, *l'uomo migliore*, Palmiro Togliatti. It eases the understanding of the shift carried out by the party over many important questions such as the alignment with the Soviets, the need of cooperating with other parties and the will to establish independent relationship with the Asian communist parties. All these changes were set forth by the new strong personality within the party: Enrico Berlinguer.

At the end a conclusion will be drafted.

CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND

This first chapter will focus on the year 1956.

The three actors that will be taken into consideration are: Italy, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the USSR. I chose to explore the year 1956 because it is extremely relevant in clarifying the background which will be unfolded throughout this section.

This chapter is divided into four parts. The first one provides information on the international situation. The following section will analyse the Italian Communist Party within the Italian framework and within Europe. The third part will address the XX congress of the CPSU and its impact on the international communist movement. The last part will analyse the tension between China and the USSR and the reasons behind it.

1.1 The international scenario

The year 1956 is unquestionably crucial for several reasons. First and foremost, the Italian Communist Party started out a new positioning on the international stage.¹ Moreover, there was the breakout of the Sino-Soviet conflict. During the XX party congress, Khrushchev delivered the *Secret Speech* denouncing Stalin's purges and demanding a less repressive era for the Soviet Union.² Beyond this, there was the Bandung Conference wherein the principle of non-alignment was declared by newly independent states. In addition to this, the delegates attending the conference expressed the idea of establishing a socialist system in each state according to national peculiarities and features. This idea started putting into question the unquestionable leadership of the Soviet Union at that time. Further, in 1956 there was the Hungarian uprising, a nationwide revolt against the Hungarian's People Republic and its model imposed by the Soviets.³

¹ For further info see: M.L.Righi, *Quel terribile '56. I verbali della direzione comunista tra il XX Congresso del Pcus e l'VIII Congresso del Pci*, Editori Riuniti, Roma 1996, pp. 138-42.

² For further info see: S.Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, vol. III. *Statesman* (1953-1964), the Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, pp. 420-25, 727-44.

³ For further info see: Tokes, Rudolf L., *Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession*, p. 317.

1.2 The Italian Communist Party

In 1956, in Italy, the government was led by Antonio Segni a representative of the Christian Democratic Party (6 July 1955-15 May 1957). During his government, the European Economic Community (EEC) was founded.⁴ It was a conservative cabinet opposed by the communists, but also by the left wing faction of the Christian Democratic Party led by Fanfani.⁵

Italy founded itself in an international scenario characterized by a bipolar system due to the Cold War and the following division of the world in two blocs: one representing the capitalism and headed by the US and the other one symbolizing the communist world with its unquestionable leader, the USSR.⁶

In March 1956, during a meeting of the Italian Communist Party directorate, the question at hand was how to handle a greater autonomy within the communist parties. Pajetta⁷ questioned himself and the other cadres about what role the USSR could fulfil within the communist movement.⁸

*There is a tendency towards a greater autonomy for the parties and, therefore, for the USSR on all these issues.*⁹

A further matter of concern was the Yugoslavian question¹⁰ and how to deal with it in order to reach a *unitary tendency*.¹¹

Following the Italian Communist Party's VIII party congress,¹² a new political trend was set forth by Togliatti namely *the Italian path towards socialism*.

1.3 The XX Congress of the CPSU

4 Italy was one of the co-founder of the EEC, signing the treaty on 25th March 1957.

5 For further info see: Franzosi Roberto, *The puzzle of Strikes: Class and State, Strategies in Postwar Italy*.

6 For further info see: Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, pp. 200-380.

7 Pajetta (June 24, 1911-September 13, 1990) was an Italian communist politician who became a party member during his youth. For further info see: Giancarlo Pajetta, *Il ragazzo rosso va alla guerra*, Mondadori.

8 For further info see: Silvio Pons, *La Rivoluzione Globale: Storia del Comunismo Globale 1917-1991*, pp. 264-312.

9 APCI, Direzione, MF198, March 16th, 1956.

10 For further info see: Richard West, *Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia*, pp. 150-345.

11 See: Spano, *ibid* 4.

12 It took place in Rome from the 8th to the 14th December 1956.

Following the death of Stalin (1953), the international communism was at its apogee. Indeed, the USSR was a nuclear superpower supervising a system of dependent and subordinate states upon which the Soviet model had been imposed. Prior to the beginning of the new conference, the Politburo decided to abolish the Cominform¹³. This news was disclosed on 18th April 1956.

During the XX Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev brought up two new topics. First, he denounced the horrible crimes committed by Stalin by means of the *Secret Speech* report. Secondly, he stressed the importance of *the peaceful coexistence*, a concept that had already been put forward by Stalin.

The disclosure set forth by Khrushchev brought about manifold consequences for the international communist movement. One of the most significant was the overflow of skepticism, distrust and doubt among the communists all over the world.¹⁴ The unquestionable Soviet leadership began to stagger.

1.4 China and the USSR: mounting tensions

In 1954, Khrushchev set up a diplomatic mission to China. It is really likely that the main goal was to re-establish a link with the People's Republic of China following the actions carried out by Stalin that had deeply worsened the relationship between the two countries. Indeed, since May 1953, an aid program was launched in favour of China by the USSR. Its aim was to foster and facilitate the exchange of technological and economic know-how.¹⁵

Further, Khrushchev believed in a fair share of the workload between the USSR and China that was meant to lead the African and Asian communist parties.

The following year the Chinese proposed an international communist conference.¹⁶ The special relationship between the two superpowers started tottering because of the fact that China

¹³ For further info see: Fernando Claudin, *Communist Movement: from Comintern to Cominform*, Monthly Review Pr (1977).

¹⁴ See: J. Haslam, *I dilemmi della destalinizzazione. Togliatti, il XX Congresso del Pcus e le sue conseguenze*, in R. Gualtieri, C. Spagnolo e E. Taviani, *Togliatti nel suo tempo*, Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Annali, XV, Carocci, Roma 2007.

¹⁵ TH. P. Bernstein and H.-Y. LI, *China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present*.

¹⁶ See: Presidium, I, doc. 101, pp. 224, 991.

recognition of USSR's central role did not mean its unconditionally acceptance of its policies and ideas. Indeed, Mao Zedong clarified that he had no intention of endorsing the process carried out by the disclosure of the *Secret Speech* against Stalin.¹⁷

¹⁷ See: Ch. Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, pp. 172-89.

CHAPTER II: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CRISIS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

*The Socialist system at the end will replace the capitalist system: this is an objective law independent from the man's will. Much as the reactionaries attempt to halt history, sooner or later the revolution will come and it will inevitably triumph.*¹⁸

This chapter is structured in three parts. The first one deals with the various reasons leading to the International Communist Crisis. The following events are tackled: the Hungarian crisis, the rise of People's Republic of China, the division within the socialist parties in capitalist countries over their link with the USSR and the process of destalinization.

The second part analyses the reasons and the consequences brought about by the crisis of the international communist movement namely the identity crisis that permeated a large amount of communist parties; the growing tension between the USSR and China and the end of the communist unity.

The third part will focus on Togliatti and his way of facing the international communist crisis. Particular attention will be paid to the Italian political context and to the debate within the Italian Communist Party.

Prior to addressing the reasons behind the International Communist Crisis, it is worth explaining what was this movement and its main purpose. The International Communist Movement was an international communist organization that advocated world communism. The International intended *to fight by all available means, including armed force, for the overthrow of the international bourgeois and for the creation of an international Soviet Republic as a transition stage to the complete abolition of the State.*¹⁹

¹⁸ Discorso alla riunione del soviet supremo dell'URSS per celebrare il 40esimo anniversario della grande rivoluzione socialista di ottobre 6 nov. 1957.

¹⁹ Quote from Silvio Pons, *La rivoluzione globale Storia del comunismo internazionale* pp181-182.

2.1. Reasons of the International Communist Crisis

2.1.1. Hungarian crisis

The starting point of the crisis of the International Communist Movement can be traced back to the outburst of the Hungarian crisis.²⁰ Following the repression carried out by the USSR and the shock that had occurred especially among the socialist parties in the West, Khrushchev started re-organizing the USSR's relationship with the communist movement. Indeed, even though, the repression in Hungary made the USSR leadership uncertain, it was justified as a necessary act due to the destabilization caused by capitalism. At this time, Khrushchev opted for summoning an international conference on global communism.²¹

The leader of the USSR tried to ease the relationship with both Yugoslavia²² and China. Tito openly refused to maintain the international communist union and he kept going on his own way.²³

On the other hand, the Chinese were the only ones supporting the USSR when it carried out the repression in Hungary. China had clearly played a fundamental role in the crisis of 1956. Khrushchev was well aware of the fundamental importance of a strong tie with the People's Republic of China. Indeed, he tried to smooth out the tensions that the Stalin diplomatic policies had caused, fostering economic and political ties. Furthermore, the Chinese recognized the central role of the USSR within the international communist movement, even though they called for a special relationship between the two countries.²⁴

2.1.2 A new player in the international scenario

Mao was guiding China towards a new path. As it has been stated previously, the Chinese had backed the Soviets throughout the Hungarian crisis. Furthermore, they proposed the

²⁰ C. Bèkès, *East Central Europe, 1953-1956*, in M.P. Leffler e O. A. Westad, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. I.

²¹ Presidium, I, doc. 34, pp. 106-7.

²² For further info see: Richard West, *Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia*, pp. 300-470.

²³ Ibid, p. 350-378.

²⁴ S. Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, vol. III.

international conference on international communism. This represented a way in which the USSR could foster its legitimacy.²⁵ The conference was divided in two parts. The first part took place from the 14th to the 17th of November and it encompassed only the parties in power.

It is relevant to focus on the documents that were drafted at the end of the conference. Sovereignty and non-interference principles were announced as well as the need for mutual aid in line with the communist internationalism. The major achievement regarded the statement of the *coexistence policy* that represented a turning point in comparison to the past. Indeed, the revolutionary path was no longer the only way by which socialism could be established.²⁶

The *coexistence policy* was one of the main causes that worsened the relationship between China and the USSR. Even though, the relationship between the two countries had improved since 1954, the main goal of China was to advance its economic development and to obtain the necessary information from the Soviets for the building of atomic bombs. This was a fundamental strategy in order to guarantee its security and to counterbalance the American pre-eminence in the Pacific.

An evident political discord between Moscow and Beijing arose throughout these years and it led towards an irreconcilable disagreement. During the conference held in 1957, Mao Zedong clearly expressed that he did not exclude a global thermonuclear war that may have destroyed the human race. He affirmed that it was a way by which the entire world could end up becoming socialist.²⁷ From this declaration, it is fairly evident that the ultra radical character of Mao Zedong astonished both the Soviets and the other socialist delegates.

The leader of the People's Republic of China did not even want to endorse the coexistence policy even because it was more convenient to keep the country in a state of permanent tension so that he could exercise political control. Other reasons for disagreement with the USSR included

25 Presidium, I, doc. 101, pp.224, 991. ZH. Shen and Ya. Xia, *Hidden Currents during the Honeymoon. Mao, Khrushchev, and the 1957 Moscow Conference*, in *Journal of Cold War Studies*, XI, Autumn 2009, n. 4.

26 Presidium, I, DOC. 137,138, 139, PP. 279-81, 1022. Presidium, II, doc. 138, pp. 720-30.

27 For further info see: M. Schoenthals, *Mao Zedong. Speeches at the 1957 Moscow Conference*, in the *Journal of Communist Studies*, II (1986), n. 2.

critique against Stalin and the fact that Mao was not at all willing to accept the Soviet model as the only one for the building of socialism within a country.

*[...] Khrushchev wants to improve the relationship with the USA? Well, we will offer him our congratulations by means of cannon shots [...] Let's ensure that the Americans are involved. Maybe we will be able to make them throw an atomic bomb on Fujian [...] We will see then what Khrushchev will have to say.*²⁸

2.1.3. The situation of socialist parties in capitalist countries

The Hungarian crisis brought about many divisions within the socialist parties of the capitalist countries. It put into question the utter acceptance of and subscription to the policies carried out by the USSR.

In Italy, Togliatti proposed *a path towards socialism* that entailed establishing the communist project by democratic means, disowning the use of violence and fully implementing the Italian Constitution.²⁹

*Once Fascism was over, the issue at stake was how to build a new society. One side of the problem was to identify the role that the worker class and the democratic forces may have. Thanks to them, a large amount of fundamental positions had been reached, representing the starting point of a renewal process that, at some point, was stopped but it became the starting point of following actions. These positions were essentially the Democratic and Republican of the State, the principles affirmed and, therefore, the overall democratic organization, that, if it were to be what the Constitutions states, would definitely be a new kind of democracy, different [...] from the traditional capitalist democracies. From this, we have inferred our general trend for the political fight, that has been a democratic fight for the application of the Republican Constitution and its political and economic principles. This was put forwards in order to get the reforms that our Constitution requires.*³⁰

²⁸ See note 19 p.189.

²⁹ For further info see: Palmiro Togliatti, *La via italiana al socialismo*, report of the CC of the PCI, 24 June 1956, in *Opere Scelte*.

³⁰ Quote from APCI, *Direction*, 1960.

Following the XX Congress of the CPUS, Togliatti tried to push for a reconstruction of the socialist doctrine. He set forth what was called *the Italian path towards socialism*. This project was based upon the respect of the representative institutions. It was against any kind of revolution and the main goal was to cooperate with the institutions in order to change them from the inside and to guarantee a smooth and continuous *path towards socialism*. This point of view was not welcomed by the establishment, especially by the Soviets that saw the Italian proposal as a form of revisionism of Marxism.

Further, it is important to recall the consequences brought about by the Hungarian revolution and how they affected the Italian leaders of the communist party. Indeed, there were different views both on the merit of the question and on the method of handling it.³¹ During this time, Giolitti was expelled from the party. He was one of the few pushing for a major and effective freedom of expression and opinion within the party. Giolitti supported all the demands that stemmed from the revolution in Hungary.³²

This is the starting point of a long crisis that characterized the Italian Communist Party and that led to a progressive estrangement from the policies carried out by the USSR.

2.1.4. The process of destalinization

When Khrushchev released the secret report, the process of destalinization started off. It put into question the main basis of the communist philosophy and the principles on which this doctrine was built. The crisis hit all the international communist parties given that Stalin was seen as a world leader that had undertaken the real construction of socialism in a country after having defeated the Nazis.³³

³¹ For further info see: Elena Aga-Rossi, Victor Zaslavsky, *Togliatti e Stalin*, il PCI e la politica estera staliniana negli archivi di Mosca, pp.217-287.

³² Ibid, 230-239.

³³ Ibid, p. 131-156.

It is interesting to note Togliatti's shift in position when addressing Stalin following the conclusions of the XX Congress of the CPUS. Indeed, just in 1953, after the death of the Soviet leader, Togliatti said:

Stalin is a master of thought and a master of action. This century will be remembered through his name, this century has been one of the most dramatic and full of crucial events in the strenuous and heroic history of humankind. ³⁴

Sharp is the contrast with the statement he released after the disclosure made by Khrushchev.

Stalin declared exaggerated and false theories, he was a victim of a perspective characterized by oppression without end, of a general and continuous mistrust, of suspicion in all directions. ³⁵

What is striking is that just after the critique of the cult of personality of Stalin by Khrushchev, Togliatti deeply criticized the Soviet leader. He called for a softer revision of the actions undertaken by Stalin. According to the Italian leader, the issues were due not that much to Stalin but to causes that could be traced back to the 1920's.

2.2. The consequences

The main consequences brought about were: the identity crisis; the tension between the Soviet Union and China and the mounting risk of a division within the international movement and, at last, the huge crisis within the Italian Communist Party. Each of them is to be probed in detail.

2.2.1. Identity crisis

The identity crisis brought about by the process of destalinization not only regarded the evaluation of the previous decade, but also the assessment of the operative tools and lenses used by

³⁴ See: Palmiro Togliatti, *Memoriale di Yalta*.

³⁵ Ibid.

intellectuals. Given that the personal mistakes made by Stalin had deeply affected the purity of the socialist doctrine, many intellectuals and politicians experienced doubts in their understanding of socialism.

Furthermore, it must be taken into account that, with Khrushchev, there was a sharp shift of policies within the USSR. The new leader was much more flexible and more prone to making compromises.

Another issue at hand that worsened the crisis of the communist parties especially in the western part of the world was how to justify the progress that capitalism had made. The clear-cut juxtaposition between capitalism and planning was no longer feasible. Indeed, society, under the aegis of capitalism, had bettered.

Thus, many astute politicians such as Togliatti started wondering whether or not a compromise with other political forces would be feasible to achieve the main goals of the socialist project. At this stage, the French party was still deeply in line with the Soviet conception but doubts had begun to arise. The fact that there was no longer just one way of understanding socialism brought about a deep crisis regarding the foundations and the beliefs of the socialist doctrine itself.

2.2.2. Tension between the Soviet Union and China and the mounting risk of a split

As previously stated, even though Khrushchev tried to better the USSR's relationship with China, his more flexible approach towards the world order did not bring about any positive outcome. In fact, on the one hand, there was the USSR exploring the possibility of an equilibrium with the enemy for the sake of world peace and the preservation of humanity. However, on the other hand, there was the Chinese leader, Mao, not willing to accept any sort of change from the traditional vision of Marxism-Leninism. The continuous revolution was the solution and the only means to defeat the enemy and establish a socialist society.

The fact that China and the Soviet Union could not get along showed that there could not be a unique communist bloc against the imperialist countries. This, later on, would become crucial and

weaken communism all over the world. This is related to the fact that these two blocs were challenging each other in order to gain more influence. It is true that, at the end, the Western Communist Parties were much more in line with the USSR.

However, the People's Republic of China was supported by many communist countries in Asia; in addition, their rhetoric was based on the defense of all the countries that were willing to free themselves from the colonization process. It was a way to overcome the bipolar system and to create a third bloc made up of all those countries that for centuries had been exploited by the capitalist countries.

2.3. Togliatti and the crisis of the International Communist Movement

In the current time of transition from capitalism to socialism –where the mass movement has overcome the democratic achievements and it has a great strength – is possible to use temporary words both economic and political ones. [...] A small amount of capitalist States may be considered in a positive way. Thus we can favour their development in certain conditions. The fundamental goal is not to create the illusion that nationalization measures may utterly change the economic situation favouring the worker class. These measures bring about new conditions in the political fight in order the reach new goals.³⁶

It is important to state that even if all the events that took place in 1956 and 1957 called into question the leadership of the Soviets, Togliatti always affirmed that the Italian Party was to be in line with the Soviet one. Indeed, at the end, he condemned the Poznan revolt³⁷ and the one in Budapest in 1956.³⁸

These events were seen as dangerous for the stability and future perspectives of socialism. He was deeply convinced that the revolts were due to mistakes carried out by the representatives of the communist parties of those countries and not because there was something wrong within the socialist system.

³⁶ See: Carlo Spagnolo, *Memoriale di Yalta*, p.97.

³⁷ See: Morris, William E. (August 2001). Lettis, Richard, ed. *The Hungarian Revolt: 23 October–4 November 1956* (Reprint ed.). Simon Publications.

³⁸ See: Auer, Stefan (2006-10-25). Annah Arendt, *Totalitarianism and the Revolutions in Central Europe: 1956, 1968, 1989*.

2.3.1. Following the XX Congress

Following the XX Congress of the CPUS that was held in Moscow in 1956, the Italian Communist Party faced an identity crisis due to the denouncement of the crimes committed by Stalin.³⁹

In particular, it is interesting to point out the position held by the leader of the PCI, Togliatti, who, on the one hand, criticized the Soviet model, however, on the other, deeply defended it.⁴⁰

The fact that Togliatti did not openly criticize the crimes committed by Stalin was driven by his way of understanding history. Indeed, he wanted to find historical circumstances to explain the mistakes carried out by the Stalin purges. This depended on his background that was built upon an orthodox Marxism.⁴¹

Indeed, criticizing Stalin would have put into question not only the historical legitimacy of the USSR, but, the basic foundation of the communist doctrine. Togliatti had always had an eye on the international context and on the importance of maintaining a precise guide within the international communism. He was convinced this duty had to be taken over by the Soviets.

*The disclosures and the critiques of Stalin's action made during the XX Congress of the CPUS and subsequently disclosed do not diminish his greatness and his brilliance.*⁴²

2.3.2. The failure of the *policentrismo* project

Given the doubts that arose in the communist world following the disclosure of Stalin crimes, Togliatti came up with the concept of *policentrismo*. This was a new blueprint for reaching socialism and a way of understanding the world order. Its main goal was to put forward a new

³⁹ For further info see: M. Flores, 1956, pp. 118-19.

⁴⁰ This is evident in the interview to Togliatti in the Italian periodical *Nuovi Argomenti* n. 20, May-June 1956.

⁴¹ For further info see: Carlo Spagnolo, *Sul Memoriale di Yalta: Togliatti e la crisi del movimento comunista internazionale (1956-1964)*, pp. 134-135.

⁴² See: P. Togliatti, *Per un giudizio equanime sull'opera di De Gasperi*, in *L'Opera di De Gasperi*, Parenti, p. 79, footnote 3.

vision for the re-organization of the communist movement, so that it could be articulated in manifold centers.⁴³

*The world has become polycentric.*⁴⁴

This is what Togliatti wrote and his statement clearly unfolded his vision of the international relations. His proposal of *policentrismo* called for passing from the bipolar system towards a world order made up of many centers. Without doubt, it was an original proposal for the transition towards socialism.

*Today [...] the Soviet Model cannot and must not be compulsory.*⁴⁵

*There is neither a leader State nor a leader party.*⁴⁶

*From what has happened, I do not believe that a drop of reciprocal trust and solidarity can be brought about among the different parties of the Communist Movement. There arises without a doubt, not only the necessity, but also the desire of a greater autonomy of judgment, and this will not bring about a benefit towards our movement. The internal political structure of the International Communist Movement has nowadays changed.*⁴⁷

The *policentrismo* proposed by Togliatti entailed an integration policy. It implied a world that was plural and, therefore, not only one way towards socialism. If the bipolar system were to be overcome, a new role for Europe could have been created.⁴⁸ One flaw of this blueprint was that there were no details or categories of lecture.

Furthermore, one of the risks was to bring about a contradiction within the Soviet leadership framework. It opened up the issue regarding capitalism and the possibility of there being no war.

43 For further info see: B. Schoch, *Die internationale Politik der italienischen Kommunisten*, Campus, Frankfurt am Main and Togliatti, *Rinnovare e Rafforzare*.

44 Ibid, Togliatti, 29.

45 From the interview in *Nuovi Argomenti*, cit. p. 727.

46 Ibid, footnote 29.

47 Interview at *Nuovi Argomenti*, cit., p. 727.

48 For further info see: Carlo Spagnolo, *Sul Memoriale di Yalta: Togliatti e la crisi del movimento comunista internazionale (1956-1964)*, pp.138.

The war was no longer an inevitable condition. What Togliatti set forth was a reformatory proposal. It opened up the possibility of pluralism within socialist states and a variety of socialist patterns.⁴⁹

*It is recognized that in order to guide and direct a socialist transformation, non-communist forces may act within the framework of the western worker movement. In addition to this, they may cooperate with those countries that are freeing themselves from the old colonialism.*⁵⁰

2.3.3 The weakening of the Italian Communist Party

Because of the unclear position held by the Italian Communist Party relating to the Hungarian facts, the leader of the socialist party Pietro Nenni⁵¹ broke with the communists. This was difficult for Togliatti to handle given that his long-standing purpose was to frame the Italian Communist Party within the legal system. Cooperation with the socialists was seen as fundamental in order to shape the Italian Communist Party goals and to carry out the vision of the PCI leader namely *the Italian path towards the establishment of communism*.

Following the break with the communists, Nenni pushed more towards supporting the Italian membership to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and closer European integration. He, furthermore, sought cooperation with the Christian Democrats, the leading party at that time.

To sum up, the main consequences of the moving away from the socialists were related to a further isolationism of the PCI from the legal framework. At a first sight, indeed, the denouncement of the Stalin crimes could have helped the PCI to move towards the institutional framework.⁵² However, given that at the end, they did not utterly separate themselves from the Soviet political line, the main consequence was to be cut out from the national political arena.

49 APCI, Fondo Mosca, Direzione, MF 198, b. 328.

50 Ingrao, *Le cose impossibili*, p. 84.

51 For further info see: Giovanni Spadolini, *Nenni sul filo della memoria (1949-1989)*; Enzo Bartalini, *Pietro Nenni*.

52 This position was held by Alicata and Amendola.

At the beginning of 1961, Togliatti was overall endorsing the Soviets and Moscow even if he was still skeptical on the absence of debate within the Soviet executive organs.⁵³ Furthermore, it is worth reminding that during the Central Committee of the 10 and 11 of November his report over the international questions was not accepted by the Italian party. This was the first time something like that happened.

A large amount of disagreement was dividing the leaders within the Italian Communist Party.⁵⁴ This was mostly due to the passive and uncritical acceptance of the Soviet way of handling international affairs. Togliatti, indeed, did not oppose the isolationist conception of the pacific coexistence carried out by the USSR since 1956.⁵⁵

The main reason of disagreement relied upon the fact that, because of the Soviet line, there could not be an *Italian way towards socialism*. Togliatti wanted to keep united the movement. At the end, he was ready to turn down the Italian proposal. However, a big discord arose with Amendola, according to whom the USSR was guilty of having divided the movement.⁵⁶

*It is important to understand the manifold situations and positions of the USSR, China, France and Italy, of Yugoslavia and Cuba. This pluralism is a necessary and unavoidable consequence of the communism progress in the world. Policentrismo is needed and it will not weaken the internationalism, on the contrary it is the pre-condition for a real internationalism.*⁵⁷

Togliatti was deaf to the arguments brought up by the other comrades. He strongly pinpointed how there was still unity, how socialism was to be prompted by trust among all the

⁵³ For further info see: P. Togliatti, *Avanti verso il comunismo, liberandosi dalle scorie del passato. Rapporto al CC e alla CCC sul XXII Congresso del PCUS, Roma, 10-11 novembre 1961*, pp. 6-7.

⁵⁴ For further info see: R. Martinelli, *Togliatti, lo stalinismo e il XXII Congresso del PCUS. Un discorso ritrovato*, in *Italia Contemporanea*, 219, giugno 2000, pp. 297-302.

⁵⁵ See: Nicolas Werth, *Storia della Russia del Novecento*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000.

⁵⁶ For further info over the disagreement between Amendola and Togliatti see: D. Sassoon, *Togliatti e la via italiana al socialismo. Il PCI dal 1944 al 1964*, p. 187.

⁵⁷ See: *Il dibattito al CC sul XXII Congresso del PCUS* in *L'Unità*, 12 novembre 1961.

socialist countries and he refused to acknowledge that there had been a real breakage between the Soviet Union and China.

The strength and the limit of the Togliatti's vision were to understand the PCI only in function of the world communism. In this way, he undermined both the Italian proposal and the unity within the party.

2.4 Preliminary conclusion

It is evident that with the advent of the new decade and of the new Soviet leadership, serious issues were to be handled both at the international level and at the national one. On the one hand, internationally Khrushchev was setting out a policy of distension towards the US. This was in sharp contrast with Mao's vision of continuous revolution. Furthermore, the destalinization process brought about mistrust and doubts in the communist environment.

At the national level the Italian Communist Party was in trouble. Different opinions divided the main leaders especially regarding the way to approach the Soviets and their leadership.

*The main problem for the party is its unity. Nowadays this unity does not exist neither at the ideological nor at the political level and we need to fight in order to build it back.*⁵⁸

What is undeniable is that since 1961 the Italian Communist Party faced an identity and political crisis over the transition question and the international linkage with the USSR.

⁵⁸ This quote is from Scoccimarro, APCI, Direzione, MF 26, pp. 344 ss.

CHAPTER III: THE YEARS 1961-63

In this chapter, the following topics will be discussed. First of all, I will discuss the major events that took place globally in 1961. Particular attention will be given to the XXII Congress of the CPUS and to the report of the CC of the PCI on it. Secondly, a detailed analysis of the tension between both the PCI and the USSR, and the CCP and the USSR will be carried out. The third part will regard the analysis of the divergences between the PCI and CCP following the participation of a Chinese delegation at the X Italian Communist Party's Congress. The last section will deal with the tension experienced by the future leadership of the Italian Party at the sudden death of Togliatti.

3.1. International events

In 1961, the following events took place:

- a. The bay of pork invasion⁵⁹ carried out by the Kennedy administration. Its main aim was to prevent the establishment of a communist regime in Cuba, which turned out a failure. Following that, there was the Cuban missile crisis wherein Khrushchev and Kennedy strenuously faced each other before reaching an agreement that would not apply the use of nuclear armament;⁶⁰
- b. The military *putch* in Algeria following the rebellion against General De Gaulle. In the 60's, a civil war occurred in Algeria, the purpose of which was to gain independence from France.

The communist world and especially countries such as the USSR and the People's Republic

⁵⁹ For further info see: G. Allison, P. Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. (New York, Pearson, 1999).

⁶⁰ Ibid, 67-198.

of China looked at this with great enthusiasm.⁶¹ Indeed, the movements of liberation were another face of the rebellion against imperialism.⁶² Thus, these movements were to be supported to counterbalance the American influence;

- c. The construction of the Berlin wall that separated the oriental from the occidental part of the city. Following this event, the PCI endorsed the choice carried out by Ulbricht, namely to build the wall and to maintain closer ties with the USSR.⁶³ Togliatti affirmed that the Italian government was making a mistake not officially recognizing the German Federal Republic.⁶⁴ According to the political leader, this mistake was due to the interference of the US in European affairs;
- d. The XXII Congress of the CPUS that was held in Moscow between the 17th and the 31st October 1961. Important questions were faced that further angered the Chinese. The topics of discussion were the following: the transition from socialism to communism, the process of destalinization and how to improve public debate on economic policies.

Khrushchev underlined that *the essential feature of current times is that socialism no longer belongs to just one country but that it has transformed itself into a world system*. He publicly stated that the goal of the socialist doctrine was to expunge enemies from the CPUS⁶⁵ and also the Albanians from the international stage⁶⁶. He also referred to the Yugoslavs, accusing them of revisionism and nationalism.⁶⁷ There was no open reference to the CCP but the relationship was still tense.

3.1.1. The report of the CC of the PCI on the XXII Congress of the CPUS

61 See: Marco Galeazzi, *Il PCI e il Movimento dei Paesi Non Allineati*.

62 Ibid.

63 See: Carola Stern, *Ulbricht: a political biography*.

64 See: P. Togliatti, *Per una soluzione negoziata del problema di Berlino*, speech delivered in front of the deputy chamber the 27th of September 1961, in L'Unità, 28th September 1961.

65 See: Stefano De Luca, *Il XXII Congresso del PCUS: la destalinizzazione tra Liberman e Solzenicyn*.

66 Ibid.

67 See: Marco Galeazzi, *Il PCI e il movimento dei paesi non allineati*, pp.

It is important to focus on the report of the CC of the PCI on the XXII Congress of the CPUS because it provides further insight on the Italian position over the issues faced within the Congress. At first sight, it is evident that the PCI was still willing to follow the directions set forth by the USSR. However, there was room for dissatisfaction. On the one hand, it is true that the leader of the PCI deeply endorsed the path undertaken during the XX Congress of the CPUS.

He further appreciated the attempt to realize a communist society in the USSR. On the other hand, many doubts began to arise with regards to the consequences brought about by the destalinization when the attack of the cult of personality was made public during the XXII Congress.

According to the Italian leader, Khrushchev poorly handled the Stalin question.⁶⁸ A crystal clear example of this was the removal of Stalin's corpse from the Lenin mausoleum: a sign of disrespect according to the Italian leader. In addition, the leader of the Soviet Union pushed for changing the name from Stalingrad to Volgograd.⁶⁹

Despite this, Togliatti was still torn between admitting the mistakes made by Stalin and recognizing the values of the majority of his actions. The denouncement of Stalin made Togliatti fall into a deep crisis regarding the standards through which he had always reasoned over communism principles.

Stalin's merits cannot be repudiated by anyone as it would be unreasonable to deny the importance of what the working class and the people of the Soviet Union realized when Stalin was head of the State and of the Party. However, was not his personal action, from a certain moment, an obstacle and a negative element for the overall situation? This is one of the conclusions that must be drawn [...].

[...] How were such serious facts able to happen and how is it possible to avoid them?

⁶⁸ For further info see: Maria Luisi Righi, *Il PCI e lo stalinismo, un dibattito del 1961 10-11 novembre*.

⁶⁹ See: P. Togliatti, *Avanti, verso il comunismo, liberandosi dalle scorie del passato*, report to the session of the CC and CCC of 10-13 November 1961 in L'Unità, 11 November 1961.

*I still do not find totally satisfactory the answer that reduces everything to the negative personal qualities of Stalin himself [...]. It is necessary to probe the causes a bit more, ending with an analysis of the objective conditions of the development in the Soviet Union not in order to justify [...] but to better the understanding of things [...].*⁷⁰

The fact that Togliatti did not openly repudiate Stalin's actions and mistakes was also due to his personality of mediator. Indeed, throughout his political career he had always found compromises and adjustments.⁷¹ Further, admitting the mistakes would have meant putting into question the basis of the socialist system itself. It would have meant challenging the statement that it was a superior system: this became the question at hand.⁷²

Following the release of the report of the CC covering the XXII congress of the CPUS, there was a big internal debate among the Italian leaders like Alicata, Amendola, Pajetta, Ingrao and Napolitano. There were many internal divisions regarding the cult of personality and the mistakes made during the Stalin period. Furthermore, many complaints were made concerning the insufficient development of socialist democracy and public debate, as well as the necessity of allowing some form of dissent within the international communist movement.⁷³

*Moreover- and I am to end my speech- I want to make a concrete proposal. If we have to arrive to a final document, even if short, I think it must be suggested this idea: that the fight in order to get rid of the cult of personality within the communist movement must carry out the outgoing ideological and political debate at all levels. I believe this factor is fundamental in order to overcome the dogmatism and in order to develop a socialist democracy.*⁷⁴

70 See: Togliatti, *The Yalta Memoir*.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 For further info see: L'Unità, 12 December 1961.

74 Quote from note 72.

Amendola was the one who criticized the Soviets most.⁷⁵ He belonged to the reformist part of the party, one that wished for cooperation with the socialists and a more flexible approach. Given his ideas, it is evident why he deeply endorsed the opinions and policies expressed by Khrushchev, in particular the goal of peaceful coexistence and possible cooperation.

He pinpointed that *it was necessary to liberate the international communist movement from the façade of unanimity that was obstructing the development of democracy*. He went further on, arguing that *the different positions must be expressed and be compared in an open political debate whereby a real unity can emerge*.⁷⁶

By means of his comments, Amendola was indirectly challenging Togliatti's leadership. Alicata, who had been a member of the Direction of the Communist Party since 1956, supported Amendola's argument, especially when he outlined the fact that, in order to save the fake unanimity, the PCI had blocked all the new proposals experimented during the 1957 Conference.⁷⁷ He deeply regretted the fact that the process of renovation stopped in order to abide by the lines provided by the USSR.

At the end of the heated debate, the report, whose final version was drafted by Togliatti, was not supported by the majority of the party. It was the first time something like that had happened.⁷⁸ Despite the harsh criticisms made by a large number of members of the party, Togliatti kept underlying the importance of the relationship with the USSR and of the choices made by the Soviet leaders.

He asserted again *the deep bond that links the Italian Communist Party with the Soviet one* adding that *if there had not been this deep trust and this unity, [...] there would not have been a*

⁷⁵ See: Carlo Spagnolo, *Sul Memoriale di Yalta: Togliatti e la crisi del movimento comunista internazionale (1956-1964)*.

⁷⁶ See: APC, Comitato Centrale, session of 10-11 November 1961, mf 025, pp.312-330.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ For further info see: L. Gruppi, *Togliatti e la via italiana al socialismo*, p.161.

*starting point for the development of a communist movement and of the Italian Communist Party*⁷⁹
[...].

Regarding the criticisms over the lack of democracy within the Soviet system, Togliatti argued that [...] *when it is said that democracy in the party is necessary, I completely agree, [...] I have been working in order to allow discussion in our party, namely a regime of internal democracy. [...] We have to pay heed to the fact that we [...] always discuss by means of a unitary basis, and we always discuss in order to reach unity among us. Here it is the difference between [...] any democracy and [...] the internal democracy that has to exist within the communist party. [...]*⁸⁰

By stating this, Togliatti reminded all the members of the party of the importance of internal unity in order to build a cohesive, efficient and effective party in line with the USSR, perceived as the leader of the communist world.

With this in mind, it is important to recall that when replying to the criticism following the 1957 conference,⁸¹ Togliatti held that it was more important to focus on the current situation and not to call into question the decisions taken in previous years. He was well aware of the fact that the divisions that had emerged within the Italian Communist Party were only partially due to different conceptions of judgment. Indeed, the issue at hand was how to frame the Italian Communist Party within the international communist movement and how to consider the relationship between it and its Soviet counterpart.⁸² The overall judgment was that any criticism towards the USSR would be dangerous and that it would challenge the international movement and its unity. Sharp and direct comments were to be avoided because they would bring about issues and divisions aimed at splitting the unity of the party.⁸³

79 See: Spagnolo, *Memoriale di Yalta*.

80 Ibid,

81 See: Donald. S. Zagoria, *the 1957 Moscow Conference and the Sino-Soviet dispute*.

82 See: M. Galeazzi, *Il PCI e il movimento dei paesi non allineati (1955-1975)*.

83 For further info see: G. Fiori, *Vita di Enrico Berlinguer*, Roma, l'Unità, Laterza, 1992, vol. 1; G. Bocca, Palmiro Togliatti.

Togliatti's point of view was only supported by the old politicians of the party. It was the beginning of a split between the old and new generations that later on would become difficult to repair. Amendola kept underlying the need to push for a renewal and for a more international role of the PCI within the international communist movement. He was deeply convinced of the importance of euro communism in order to counterbalance the Soviet influence.

Before addressing the final outcome of this report, it is important to recall that a young leader was making his way at this time. It was Berlinguer⁸⁴ who stepped into the debate denouncing the insufficient theoretical elaboration of the communist movement whose internal divergences were due to different levels of development in various socialist countries.

Following the debate, all the members convened to draft a report pinpointing the elements of novelty belonging to the Italian path.⁸⁵ Many points were unfolded among which it is important to remember the need for political debate to avoid the mistakes of the past and the conservative standoff against the line proposed during the XX Congress.⁸⁶

The Italian communist leaders recognized that the conferences held both in 1957 and in 1960 had been inadequate to properly deal with the mistakes and qualms brought about by the cult of personality.⁸⁷ Overall, the resolution carried out, following the debate, was fairly open to the positions expressed by Amendola and, at the end, the report held a position of criticism towards the USSR. It is worth mentioning that the new draft again proposed topics such as the *policentrismo* and *the peculiarity of Western Europe*. However, it expressed a defensive and moderate position because of the national political situation and because of the character of the Italian communist leader that was known for being a mediator.

84 See: Guido Liguori, *Berlinguer rivoluzionario. Il pensiero politico di un comunista rivoluzionario*.

85 IG, APC, Direzione, 17-18 November 1961, mf. 025, pp. 1660-1692.

86 For further info see: Alexander Hobel, *PCI e movimento comunista internazionale 1956-1964. Dal XX Congresso del PCUS al Memoriale di Yalta*, pp. 24-25.

87 Ibid.

3.2. The PCI towards other parties

It is crucial to understand the international reactions that followed the release of the report. On the one hand, the French Communist Party headed by Thorez disapproved the ideas expressed, nailing them down as a tendency towards division. Thus, it was evident that the Italian Communist Party could not counterbalance the USSR, given the lack of support from the French Party. In addition to this, the principal leaders of the USSR: Suslov, Ponomarev, Kozlov deeply disapproved the *policentrismo* project.⁸⁸ When the Soviets replied to this report, further criticisms and divergences were brought up within the Italian Communist Party.

Togliatti deeply criticized the Albanian party and the support it received by the CCP.⁸⁹ Furthermore, he stressed the importance of improving relations with other European parties such as the French communist party. He really believed that the European communist parties could play a decisive and avant-garde role within the world communist movement. It was a project by which to overcome the division of the world into two blocs.

Regarding the USSR, Togliatti was aware of the fact that the Soviets were facing the *Chinese issue* and they were to act responsibly.⁹⁰ The first irreconcilable divergence from the CPUS started to unfold regarding how to handle the Chinese debate. This is evident from all the internal discussions that followed the XXII Congress and that divided the Italian communist group as previously stated. However, at the same time, the PCI kept sticking to the main Soviet line, refusing to accept or follow the Chinese pattern that, under the aegis of Mao Zedong, was far more revolutionary than the Italian way. What is striking is that the Italian communists wanted to reaffirm their reliability to the Soviets but, at the same time, they stressed their autonomy of thinking and acting.

During these years, the figure of Berlinguer started to emerge. Worth mentioning is his position on the debate with the USSR. He stressed that *imperialism and capitalism cannot be*

⁸⁸ See: Carlo Spagnolo, *Memoriale di Yalta*.

⁸⁹ For further info see: J. Guillermez, *Storia del Partito comunista cinese. II. Il Partito comunista al potere (1 ottobre 1949- 1 marzo 1972)* p. 349-378.

⁹⁰ IG, APC, Direzione, 7 December 1961, mf.025, pp. 1693-1718.

*defeated in the absence of a third crucial factor: the fight of the Western working class, the advancement of a revolutionary movement that strikes imperialism and capitalism at the core.*⁹¹

Berlinguer further underlined the necessity of reaffirming all the achievements reached by the Soviets in order to avoid any façade of defeat.⁹² Following this long debate, it seemed that unity was achieved once more within the Italian Communist Party. On the international stage, however, during the international peace conference held in Stockholm, it became evident that the international unity of the communist movement did not exist anymore.⁹³

With regards to the international communist movements, the situation was even more strained. Indeed, since 1962, the break of the Soviet-Albanian relationship was confirmed. Also, the tension between the Soviets and the Chinese did not ease up. It was a difficult time for the communist world given that the capitalist part achieved the first good results. The average salary of the people was increasing as well as the working class was gaining more protection and security from the State even though the representatives were not socialists, but often conservative. Instead, the situation in the third world was still extremely precarious given that the decolonization process was still going on.

3.3. The divergences between Togliatti and the Chinese communists

At the beginning of 1962, the Italian Communist Party was on his way to prepare the X Congress. The crucial goal was to develop and specify the role of the Western Communist Parties given the unstable international situation.⁹⁴ Togliatti was willing to adopt the concept of *peaceful coexistence* and to implement it with manifold parties such as the conservative and the capitalist enemies. Furthermore, he quibbled with the positions held by the Chinese and the Albanians.⁹⁵

⁹¹ See: E. Berlinguer, *Maturi il movimento politico generale per la svolta a sinistra*, report to the session of CC and CCC of PCI of 20-23 December 1961, in L'Unità, in E. Berlinguer, P. Togliatti, *La forza, lo sviluppo e i compiti del PCI nel momento presente*, Roma, 1962, pp. 3-70.

⁹² See: Alexander Hobel, *PCI e movimento comunista internazionale 1956-1964. Dal XX Congresso del PCUS al Memoriale di Yalta*, p. 27.

⁹³ IG, APC, Secretary, 24 January 1962, mf. 026, pp.650-652.

⁹⁴ For further info see: L. Longo, *La convocazione del Congresso del Partito*, report to the session of CC of PCI of 26-28 April 1962, l'Unità, 27 April 1962.

⁹⁵ See: C. Spagnolo, Memoriale di Yalta.

Togliatti stressed the importance of the *peaceful coexistence* even to counterbalance the revolutionary position held by the leader of the People's Republic of China Mao Zedong.

*Nowadays a world war would mean a nuclear confrontation and thus, the destruction of the main sites of our civilization. And following a nuclear conflict, I truly believe that for the part of humankind left, there will be no issue of how to advance socialism. [...] Socialism is a society based upon the biggest development of productive forces whose development cannot start off from the destruction of the sites more advanced of productive forces.*⁹⁶

A Chinese delegation took part at the Italian Congress with the hope to strengthen the fight against imperialism, to defend world peace and the unity of the international communist movement according to the principles expressed with the first and the second declaration of Moscow.

The main accusations that the CCP moved against the PCI were that the Italians did not respect the Marxism-Leninist doctrine and that they were trying to break the unity of the Communist Movement.

The biggest difference between the two parties was that the PCI was pushing for a kind of bourgeois reformism and the so-called structural reforms. This was not acceptable because it meant the abandonment of the proletarian revolution. Thus, the *Italian path towards socialism* was perceived by the Chinese as non-sense and heresy.

It is fundamental to discuss the divergences with the Chinese, that, in order to ease the understanding for the reader, have been divided as follows: peace and war; the use of nuclear arms and the legitimacy of nuclear war; the imperialists and the conservatives perceived as cartoon tigers; the concept of *peaceful coexistence*; the pacific and democratic path towards socialism and, at last, the relationship towards the Yugoslav revisionist group.

3.3.1. On peace and war

⁹⁶ See: P. Togliatti, *Verso il X Congresso del Partito*, intervention to the session of CC of 26-28 of April 1962, in *l'Unità*, 28 April 1962, in *Togliatti e il centrosinistra*, vol. II, pp. 1085-1100.

The Chinese delegation argued that the Italians had deeply misunderstood their conception on war and peace. Indeed, it was not true as Togliatti was suggesting that the Chinese communists were in favor of the war. The Chinese only stressed out that the imperialists were the ones carrying out an aggressive politics aimed at waging wars among the people.

It was the US imperialism the main cause of the wars in the world. In fact the US was to be considered the enemy of world peace. According to the Chinese, this was pretty evident. Thus, they deeply criticized the position of the PCI that was damaging the real fight and was extremely accommodating. Indeed, they were open to compromise with Kennedy.⁹⁷ The only way to avoid becoming revisionist was not to believe in this fake pacific policy that was bewildering and damaging the fight for the peace in the world.

*Is this way to embellish the US imperialism the fair politics in order to defend the peace in the world? They sent spy planes within the USSR, the attack towards Cuba by the Kennedy administration and its aggressions all over the world by the US and its attacks to the world peace: does not all of this represent a confirmation that the US is a war monster? These people that always try to embellish the imperialism are definitely lying to the people of the world.*⁹⁸

The Chinese suggested that in order to preserve the world peace was important to continue a resolute fight against the US together with the strengthening of the socialist camp. The Chinese delegation held that compromises were feasible as far as they did not put into question the basic principles upon which the socialist doctrine was built. They also blamed the Italian communists of not understanding the real doctrine, but to look for the so-called *reasonable compromises* with the enemy. This was the biggest mistake ever given that the imperialism was the worst thing that could happen in this world.

⁹⁷ See: Giorgio Bocca, *Togliatti*.

⁹⁸ Extract from the document sent to the PCI following the Congress.

The path towards peace is not the path of the sacrifice or of the violation of people's rights because this is definitely the path that leads towards the war.

Fidel Castro

The last advice given by the Chinese delegation in order to preserve peace was to strengthen the relationship between the national liberation movements and popular revolutionary fights. Indeed, colonialism was another façade of imperialist domination. Since plenty of countries were fighting in order to free themselves from this domination, it was likely that they would turn towards the socialist way, once free to choose.

To conclude, the Chinese delegation denounced the imperialism, called for the strengthening of the socialist camp and called upon the endorsement of liberation movements. All these steps were fundamental in order to preserve world peace. They stressed out how much they did care about peace and how little they disapproved the use of war.

3.3.2. The use of nuclear arms

The international community had pointed out that the Chinese were in favor of using nuclear power. However, following the X Congress and the report written on it, it was evident that this was a libel.

What was at stake was the difference between what were understood as fair wars and what were not. This was one of the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. The Chinese delegation reminded all the parties at the Italian Congress that those who did not believe in this difference namely between fair and not fair wars, were embracing the fake bourgeois pacifism.

The main issue about nuclear arms can be explained as follows. On the one hand, Togliatti embraced a pessimistic vision: he thought that the use of nuclear arms would bring about the end of humanity. On the other one, the Chinese were pretty optimistic given that the use of the nuclear arms would bring about not the end of humanity, but the end of the imperialists. Beyond this, the Chinese delegation pinpointed that in order to excise the evil of imperialism, the continuous fight

could not be abandoned. They blamed Togliatti because he *fears and trembles* and argued that the war was to be avoided at any price.

3.3.3. The imperialists and the conservatives as cartoon tigers

A large number of communist parties did not share the point of view that all the imperialist powers could be perceived as cartoon tigers. The Chinese argued that considering them as cartoon tigers was helpful for the assessment and for fostering the revolutionary trust.

*All the reactionaries are simply cartoon tigers. In order to fight against the enemy, we have to apply the following concept: from a strategic point of view we have to dislike all our enemies, but, at the same time, we always have to take them into account. Marx and Engels were only two persons. However, at their time, they stated that capitalism would be overthrown in all over the world. We have to take them in a serious way, otherwise we would commit a serious mistake.*⁹⁹

The Italians were accused of having lost the quality of being revolutionary. They were said to be *blind as a mouse*. Togliatti and his leadership were pushing for compromises and cooperation with conservative parties that, however, would never change their mind and their way to oppress the people. The Chinese delegation urged the Italians not to abandon the main principles of Marxism-Leninism and to follow all its principles in order to build a fair society.

3.3.4. On the peaceful coexistence

With regard to this topic, the Chinese underlined how it was not true that they were against the *peaceful coexistence* as it was argued by plenty of Western Communist Parties and by the USSR too.

The point at hand was that the PCI was fully supporting the pacific coexistence doctrine that according to Togliatti was effectively carried out by Khrushchev when handling the Cuban missile crisis.¹⁰⁰ It was a blatant example that a world war could be avoided in the name of peace and

⁹⁹ See note 97.

¹⁰⁰ See: G. Allison, P. Zelikow, *Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*.

coexistence. On this ground, the leader of the Italian Communist Party unquestionably rejected the position held by the Albanians and the Chinese that saw in Khrushchev's decisions a weakness and a failure in the fight against capitalism and imperialism.

According to the Western Communist Parties, the Chinese did not believe in the pacific coexistence. This policy could not replace the incontestable need of continuous revolution.¹⁰¹ One of the most important Italian communist leader, Pajetta, accused the Chinese of trying to divide the international communist unity.¹⁰²

Pajetta held that the Chinese were holding back the international communist movement when they affirmed that the pacific coexistence was not feasible and that the only way to achieve socialism was by means of a continuous revolution.

Regarding the position held by the Chinese, Togliatti explained:

*Affirming that they want to carry out a frontal attack against the imperialism, they ward off the fight of the masses for peace and pacific coexistence, that is the current fight against imperialism. [...] Their internationalism consists of attacking the fair positions together developed by the communist movement with the aim of crumbling this movement and of breaking its unity [...]. I am astonished that the Chinese comrades do not see that nowadays this is the function taken on by the Albanian representative and that they maintain with them a non-acceptable solidarity.*¹⁰³

The Chinese rebutted this argument stating that it was them that had firstly developed the concept of *peaceful coexistence*.¹⁰⁴ The only difference is that the Chinese believed legitimate to use it with other socialist countries, but not with the imperialists and reactionary countries. According to them, the coexistence policy with the reactionary countries would not solve issues as class struggle and the deep antagonism that divided the two systems in two opposite blocs.

101 For further info see: J. Guillermaz, *Storia del Partito Comunista Cinese*.

102 Ibid, p. 34 and G.C. Pajetta, *Problemi del movimento comunista internazionale*, report to the session of the CC of the ICP of 25-26 July 1963, l'Unità, 27 July 1963.

103 See: Spagnolo, *Memoriale di Yalta*.

104 See: Henry Kissinger, *On China*.

The Italian leader was accused of pushing for a fusion and a deeper cooperation of the two systems. They made up their mind this way following the project of the structural reforms that encompassed some elements of the capitalist economy. This was understood not only as revisionist but also as a betrayal of the most important socialist principles.¹⁰⁵

Togliatti was pushing for the establishment of *a new world order* that would overcome the bipolar system and would be characterized by the predominant role of the European communist parties. The Chinese held that there would never be *peaceful coexistence* between the oppressors and oppressed nations. The only solution was the revolutionary struggle in order to overrule the imperialist dominance.

Another reason of disagreement was the fact that the PCI was willing to compromise with the capitalist and imperialist countries in order to help the people of the Third World. The reasons lied on the fact that anything that would help and improve the situation of these people was to be considered legitimate. However, the Chinese delegation deeply believed that this cooperation would not bring about any sort of improvement. It was rather a form of neo-colonialism. Thus, communist parties were not to make compromises with the imperialists because their altruism was only a façade to set forth another form of dominance.

At the end, the utter truth was that compromise with the reactionary countries was not possible. The policy of *peaceful coexistence* was only a way to make concessions to the imperialism. The Italian path was heretic as well as the coexistence policy advocated by the leader of the USSR Khrushchev.

3.3.5. The pacific and democratic path towards socialism

The People's Republic of China was utterly against the structural reforms proposed by the PCI. They were pestered by Togliatti's statement that *the pacific transition had become a world strategic principle of the working class movement and of the communist movement.*

105 For further info see: *Le divergenze tra il compagno Togliatti e noi* at www.sitocomunista.it/altri/cina/divergenze.htm.

With this declaration, Togliatti was not respecting what expressed in *State and Revolution* written by Lenin¹⁰⁶. The Italian leader stated that at the current time the proletarian revolution could be avoided because it was not necessary. Socialism could be established gradually by means of structural reform and cooperation with other political parties. There was not anymore room for a proletarian revolution. Every action had to be in line with the institutional framework wherein the party had to act.

*Our action within the internal situation of our country is the fight in order to renew the structures of the whole world.*¹⁰⁷

According to the Chinese point of view, the assessment made by Togliatti was the outcome of an analysis carried out through the lenses of idealism not historical materialism as it should be done by a Marxist scholar. Furthermore, the Italian path cannot be understood as carrying world strategic principles given that it was in full contradictions with the basic socialist principles.

The harshest condemnation regarded the proposal of structural reforms. It was not accepted by the Chinese because it was understood as a form of bourgeois reformism. They went further on with their critique stating that the Italian path was a way to abandon the revolution even though, according to the Italians, it was the best common project for the utter international communist movement.

3.3.6. On the Yugoslav revisionist group

The Chinese accused the Italians of being too close to the positions held by the Yugoslav revisionist group.¹⁰⁸ The PCI was acting not in line with the two Declarations of Moscow. The 1960 Declaration of Moscow affirmed that *the communist parties have condemned the Yugoslav way of the international opportunism. It represents a revisionist theory. Following their betrayal of the*

106 See: Vladimir Llich Lenin, *State and Revolution*.

107 Quote from the documents of the APCI.

108 Ibid.

Marxism-Leninism, that had been considered old by the Yugoslavs, the main representatives of the Yugoslav communists have opposed their revisionist program to the Moscow Declaration of 1957; they have put the Yugoslav communists against the whole International Communist Movement.

By having a relationship with Tito, it seemed that the Italian group was denying the statement released in Moscow. Furthermore, the Chinese stressed out that Tito was not acting beyond the two blocs, he was receiving help from the US,¹⁰⁹ building not a different version of socialism but another kind of capitalism.

For all the abovementioned reasoning, Yugoslavia was not to be considered socialist anymore. The restoration of capitalism was on his way given the large amount of bourgeois elements within the State apparatus.

The Italian Party was to pay heed on this, given that strengthening the ties with Tito would mean repudiating the real meaning of communism.

3.3.7. On Marxism-Leninism itself

The last reason of divergence between the Italian and the Chinese Communist Parties regarded the applicability of the Marxist Leninist doctrine itself. The question at hand was whether or not its principles were still applicable and whether or not the two Declarations of Moscow were or not obsolete and outdated.

Togliatti firmly held that the laws of Marxism Leninism were obsolete and not applicable to the current time, especially in Italy. For this reason, the Italian path was set out. According to the Chinese delegation attending the X PCI's Congress, the Italian leader tried to defend his point of view by mistaken means. For example, he affirmed that the Chinese revolution did not happen following the main principles of the October revolution.¹¹⁰ This was obviously false and misleading given that the Chinese people carried out their revolution always paying heed to the experience of the Soviets.

109 See: Carlo Spagnolo, *Il memoriale di Yalta*.

110 See: *Le divergenze tra il compagno Togliatti e noi* at www.sitocomunista.it/marxismo/altri/cina/divergenze.htm.

The Marxist doctrine furnishes the lens through which judging and assessing history. It does not bring about dogmatism given that the principles are to be adapted to the current circumstances. However, the content of the principles is always the same, given that they represent an undeniable truth.

The Chinese communist leaders that attended the X Italian Congress argued that the Italian Party attacked the Chinese on matters of principle, stating that they were acting contrary to the second Declaration of Moscow. The Chinese rebutted that they were not breaking the unity but that the unity was in danger because of the Italians who were acting against the main doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. Indeed, the Chinese held that the Italian counterpart was repudiating the fundamental antagonism between the two world systems, capitalism and socialism, and the even more fundamental difference between oppressor and the oppressed nations. They could not accept the fact that the Italian leader, Togliatti, was stressing out the importance of a dialogue and cooperation with the imperialist forces.

The creation of a new world order was not seen as a creative innovation of the Marxist doctrine, but it was perceived as an outrage and a form of revisionism. It was absolutely to condemn and to eliminate.

What the Italians were proposing was a revision of the Marxist doctrine. They were putting forward a kind of revisionism, that represented the worst danger to the unity of the doctrine and of the movement. Indeed, as it was explained in the two Moscow Declarations:

*The modern revisionism resembles the bourgeois ideology in theory and in practice, it changes the Marxism Leninism, it gets rid of its revolutionary push and, thus, it blocs the revolutionary spirit of the working class. It alienates them in the fight against the oppression of the imperialists, for the peace, the democracy, the national freedom and the triumph of socialism.*¹¹¹

111 Ibid.

The mistake consisted in the fact that those who are revisionists believe they are fighting dogmatism. Instead, the undeniable truth is that they are just opposing themselves to the main principles of Marxism-Leninism. The main consequence of embracing the revisionist approach is to break the communist unity and to endanger the communism itself.

The Chinese not only accused the Italians of favoring the development of coexistence between the oppressed people and the capitalist countries, but also to have abandoned the traditional Marxism Leninist doctrine. They went on arguing that *according to their theory [...] there is no need, nowadays in Italy, of a worker revolution, there is no need of removing the bourgeois state apparatus and there is no need of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat: there is the chance of establishing socialism gradually and peacefully [...]. Indeed they believe the State is a tool above the social classes and they deem the bourgeois State is able to follow a socialist political route.*¹¹²

3.4 The international situation within the communist movement

During the Congress, it was obvious the amount of divergences within the International Communist Movement. The Albanians were accused of secessionism and they were supported only by the Chinese.

There was a heated debate between an Italian and a Chinese delegate. The CCP accused the PCI to be willing to transform the Congress in an arena by means of which attacking another communist party, namely the Chinese one.¹¹³ Despite all the differences that arose with the CCP, the Italian representatives and among them Pajetta, stressed out that the divergences did not have to obstruct the relationship between the two parties. A possible common action was to be found.¹¹⁴

Moreover, during the Congress, Togliatti reminded all the delegations and, in particular, the Chinese one that in the last two world conferences, the *peaceful coexistence* and the structural

¹¹² See the article: *Le divergenze tra il compagno Togliatti e noi*, Rinascita, 12 January 1963.

¹¹³ See: Alexander Hobel, *PCI e movimento comunista internazionale 1956-1964, Dal XX Congresso del PCUS al Memorial di Yalta*, pp.29.

¹¹⁴ For further info see: *X Congresso del Partito comunista italiano. Atti e Risoluzioni*, Roma, 1963.

reforms were endorsed by the large majority of communist parties. Thus, the CCP was to abide by that strategy. He also called upon the Chinese to withdraw their support towards the Albanians given that that party was trying to crumble the unity of the International Communist Movement. The leader of the Italian Communist Party truly believed that all the differences with the Chinese were likely to be overcome by means of a debate.

At the end of 1962, the break with China and Albania was fairly evident and it definitely marked the end of the international unity.

One of the most important achievements of the X Italian Congress was to reinforce the relationship with the Soviets and their strategy of pacific coexistence. There was an open and clear alignment with the Soviet position that was openly against the Chinese ones.¹¹⁵ On the contrary the gap between the Italian communists and the Chinese further increased.

At the end, the Chinese communists replied fairly harshly to the Italian position:

*Ultimately, the approach taken by Togliatti and by other representatives of the Italian Communist Party can be reduced to this: the people's of the capitalist countries should not carry out the revolution, the oppressed nations should not lead emancipation and liberation struggles and the people's of the world should not fight against imperialism. Indeed, all of this is fully in line with the needs of the imperialists and of the reactionaries.*¹¹⁶

3.5. Togliatti's reply to the Chinese critique

Togliatti was an astute politician deeply aware of the changes within the international system. He carefully chose the wordings in order to reply to the Chinese critique, always with the maximum respect. His goal was to justify to them the importance of the pacific coexistence and the fact that the Italian Communist Party was not betraying his values and was not engaging in a partnership with the capitalist and imperialist sections of the country.

¹¹⁵ For further info see: P. Togliatti, *Una strategia mondiale*, Rinascita, 15 December 1962, in *Togliatti e il centrosinistra.*, cit., vol. II, pp. 1171-1174.

¹¹⁶ See note 92.

The peaceful coexistence does not mean status quo, but it is a new order of the international relations. It helps assuring to all the people's of the world their independence and their freedom. During the Caribbean crisis it was [...] evident that the imperialists were to commit any kind of crimes. For this reason, we cannot accept to call them paper tigers. [...] The basis of imperialism is threatened by contradictions that, at a certain stage, will become insurmountable. Anyway these contradictions are not evident and they will not set off unless a fight happens, whose main goal has to be the greatest mobilization of the masses. [...] The main goal is to avoid the war establishing a regime of peaceful coexistence [...].

Togliatti was fiercely defending *the Italian path towards socialism* and especially the principles upon which it was built.

In the democratic structure wherein we live in our country [...] wherein the bourgeois class is still dominant, can the worker class, can we be able to lead a mass action in order to achieve substantial reforms? [...] In as much as this happens, [...] there is a change in favor of the working class [...] and in the way power is exercised by the State. An advance towards a new regime is achieved [...] but, in order to reach this goal, it is necessary a great mass mobilization [...] with all brutalities that this movement may bring about. [...] The pacific path and the non pacific one always mingles each other. From a pacific and democratic mass movement, a civil war could always stem, because the bourgeois class is always willing to use violence. [...] But, then it is feasible [...] to develop such a big mass movement that the rulers remain crippled and there is the chance of radical changes [...] by means of a democratic path [...].¹¹⁷

In this context, the Soviets stood by the side of the Italians, pinpointing the fact that when the Chinese addressed the PCI as revisionist, they were attacking what can be defined as a constructive and creative version of the Marxism Leninism.¹¹⁸

Above all Togliatti believed in the *Italian pattern towards socialism* because it was the result of a careful and dedicated analysis of reality. He thought the divergence with the Chinese was

117 See: Spagnolo, *Memoriale di Yalta* pp. 176.

118 See: Alexander Hobel, *PCI e movimento comunista internazionale 1956-1964. Dal XX Congresso del PCUS al Memoriale di Yalta*, p.31.

more related to the method of analyzing external factors. Indeed, the Chinese seemed to stick to the concept of continuous revolution without taking into account the changes in the international environment.¹¹⁹

Togliatti tried to overcome this divergence asking the Chinese counterpart for a meeting between the two delegations.¹²⁰ However, the CCP kept refusing this proposal and addressing the PCI as revisionist. Further, they argued the PCI was too close to the heretic positions expressed by Tito in particular with regards to the Hungarian revolution.¹²¹ The CCP deeply attacked the position held by the Italian Communist Party and its political culture. They stood by their decision not to have a bilateral meeting with the Italians and they demanded a world conference of communist parties.¹²²

In this context, it is worth taking into consideration that the Chinese view was due to the fact they could not support the policies set forth by Khrushchev and, at the same time, they wanted to separate themselves from the bipolar system characterized by the two superpowers of the USSR and the USA. China was willing to become the stronghold for all the oppressed people and countries that had been subjected to the colonization process.¹²³

From this background, it is easily understandable the big gap between the Chinese and the Western and Soviet communists. Indeed, the last ones were willing to push for the establishment of a socialist society in the countries where the productive forces were far more developed and to achieve this through a democratic coexistence with the capitalist forces. Instead, for the Chinese this was not feasible at all. They wanted to pay heed to the countries strained by colonization, where the productive forces were not that developed but the people were ready to carry out a fierce and harsh revolution against the reactionaries.

119 Ibid p. 32.

120 See: P. Togliatti, *Riconduciamo la discussione ai suoi termini reali*, Rinascita, 12 January 1963; and IG, APC, Secretary, 11 January 1963, mf. 027, pp. 632-635.

121 See: Carlo Spagnolo, *Il Memoriale di Yalta*.

122 See: IG, APC, Secretary, 3 April and 14 May 1963, mf. 027, pp. 713-714 and 721-729.

123 See: Marco Galeazzi, *Il PCI e il movimento dei paesi non allineati (1955-1975)*.

*The different kind of contradictions of the current world are present in the regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America: here the imperialist dominance is weaker, this is the area of the world revolution [...]. To a certain extent, the cause of the international proletariat revolution is dependent upon the outcome of the revolutionary fight brought up by these people of these regions that represent the overwhelming majority of the world population.*¹²⁴

Given this context of harsh divisions among different communist parties, Togliatti unfolded the concept of *unity in diversity*¹²⁵ that stemmed from the unquestionable evidence that divergences were to exist given the huge expansion of the communist movement. He thought that the only way to overcome the divergences was by means of an ongoing debate that would guarantee a better understanding of each other perspectives.

*I do not believe [...] in the possibility and efficacy of an international consensus where every question can be taken into account [...] and where for everything there will be an adequate solution. [...] It is truly unreal the solution of empowering only one party to trace the path and to check how the other parties are progressing. The extent and the complexity of the movement make it impossible. Indeed the stage we have reached is that of autonomy of the single parties that rules out the chance of only one party-guide.*¹²⁶

At last what Togliatti scold the Chinese about was to have lost the skill to analyze the concrete situation and to have ended up being dogmatic.¹²⁷

3. 6. Preliminary conclusion

In the length of time 1961-1963, Togliatti started questioning some policies carried out by the USSR. It is worth mentioning the tension that began to arise regarding the announcement of an international conference. Togliatti believed it was not the appropriate time given the many divergences that were dividing the International Communist Movement. He was pushing for

124 See: Silvio Pons, *La Rivoluzione Globale, storia del comunismo internazionale*.

125 See: Carlo Spagnolo, *Memoriale di Yalta*.

126 Ibid.

127 See: P. Togliatti, *Control il dogmatismo, per una politica marxista*, *Rinascita*, 31 August 1963.

regional conferences. Instead, the Soviets were willing to hold an international conference in order to gain a world condemnation of the Chinese position.

However, he maintained a close relationship with the Soviets especially regarding the crisis of the imperialist exploitation and the acceptance of the undeniable socialist achievements.

This period of time is still marked by the harsh and heated debate between the USSR and the People's Republic of China. The PCI aligned himself along the Soviet position, engaging in a debate with the Chinese counterpart during its X Congress.

CHAPTER IV: THE CHINESE ISSUE AND THE EURO COMMUNISM

In this chapter the following topics will be probed. First of all, the positions of the Euro parties towards the Sino-Soviet debate. The Chinese issue will be further analyzed and especially the Italian way of dealing with it.

The main goal is to show that the Italian communist leader, Togliatti, was trying to overcome the bipolar system, trying to foster a European cohesion among communist parties. The point at hand is that 1964 is the year Togliatti died and this represented a major shift within the Italian Communist Party because on the one hand there was an inner fight to gain the leadership and on the other, the Italian project of *policentrismo* and *unity in diversity* was provisionally abandoned.

In order to investigate this thesis, I mostly used the memoir written by Togliatti before he died, named the *Yalta Memoir*.¹²⁸

4.1. Tense relations with the Chinese Communist Party: possible outcome

The PCI was aware of the fact that it had to take a clear position regarding the Sino-Soviet debate, especially following the harsh critics during the X Italian Congress.¹²⁹

Before addressing the way the Italian position was understood by the Soviets, it is worth mentioning the fact that throughout the years 1963-64 the PCI's foreign policy considerably developed and spread its goals and objectives.¹³⁰ This was mainly due to two reasons. First of all, at that time, the Italian government was run by a center-left coalition. The Prime Minister was Aldo

128 Togliatti died as a result of cerebral haemorrhage while on holiday in Yalta then in the Soviet Union in 1964.

129 Ibid.

130 For further info see: Carlo Spagnolo, *Sul Memoriale Di Yalta*.

Moro¹³¹ who was unconditionally supported by the Christian Democratic Party and by the Italian Socialist Party. This meant that, at the national level, the Italian Communist Party was less attacked.

Secondly, in order to overcome the bipolar system and the predominance of the USSR, Togliatti wanted to increase the role of the European Communist Parties within the international communist framework. Indeed, since 1956, he had been pushing for the spread of *policentrismo* and *unity in diversity*. It is true that he had never openly opposed the policies carried out by the Soviets but, since the Hungarian revolt and in particular following the Sino-Soviet debate, a huge division occurred within the Italian Communist Party and their way of thinking of the Soviet Union itself as the unquestionable leader of the communist world.

4.2. The Euro communist dream: the PCI, the PCF and their understanding of international communism

In comparison to the French Communist Party, the Italian counterpart had always been more flexible and more detached from the Soviet influence, especially following 1956.

There are plenty of examples that can show how the Italian Party was becoming more independent from the Soviet influence. The most important worth mentioning is the development of the common market within Europe. Indeed, the French Communist Party was deeply adverse to the establishment of this system because it was seen as another means of exploitation by the imperialists and the capitalist sections of the society. Instead, the PCI and its main leaders among which Togliatti, Amendola and Berlinguer was more favorable to it.¹³² Togliatti was aware of the fact that in order to reach some goals of the socialist project, it was important to avoid an attitude of non-involvement within the institutional framework. His way of understanding socialism relied on the fact that in the western countries capitalism was bringing about benefits for the population. Thus, in order to carry out the socialist plan, cooperation was required with the other governmental

131 For further info see: Alfonso Alfonsi, *Aldo Moro nella dimensione internazionale. Dalla memoria alla storia*.

132 See: IG, APC, Secretary, 5 February 1963, mf.027, pp. 669-671.

forces. This, as stated in the previous chapter, was one of the main difference and reason of debate between the Italian Party and the Chinese one.¹³³

Togliatti believed that an integrated Europe would have helped overcoming the bipolar system and helped shaping a different approach towards the establishment of socialism, given the many divergences among the different countries.¹³⁴

The Italian Communist Party and the French one agreed upon the need of maintaining the unity of the movement as well as to stand against the division within the movement itself carried out by the Chinese.¹³⁵ At the beginning they both pushed for the convocation of a conference encompassing only the communist parties of capitalist countries within Europe.¹³⁶ This was related to the fact that a European conference could unfold a strategy by which handling the Chinese question in an independent way from the Soviets. However, there was a sudden and quick turn undertaken by the French Communist Party. They ended up calling for an international conference as strongly demanded by the Soviets.¹³⁷ The Italian Party could not stand against the Soviets, because the USSR was still the leader of the communist world. Following a long debate, the main leaders decided to join the conference but not to sign the declaration in case in which it was sharply in contrast with their own beliefs.

From this, it can be easily inferred that the euro communist project was challenging to carry out, given that the two main communist countries in Europe, France and Italy, could be easily divided by the Soviet influence.

4.3. The PCI and the increasing divergence with the USSR

At the beginning of the sixties, it was evident that the Italian and the French Communist Parties could not build a common line within the communist world. Furthermore, the worsening of

133 Ibid.

134 See: IG, APC, Direzione, 13 and 21 February 1963, mf. 027, pp. 303-318 and 319-331.

135 The way of handling the Chinese question would become reason of discors between the two European parties.

136 See: IG, APC, Secretary, 29 May and 28 June 1963, mf. 027, pp. 740-742 and 781-789.

137 See: IG, APC, Direzione, 12 September and 11 October 1963.

the Sino-Soviet debate and how to handle it, became reason of division between the Italians and the Soviets. The point at stake was whether or not the Chinese position had to be condemned.

Over this question, the PCI had an attitude pretty accommodating. Indeed, not only the Italian Communist Party was one of the few not willing to accept the convocation of an international conference, but also it was the only one that had freely accepted the circulation of Chinese materials, especially the publication of the *Opere* by Mao.¹³⁸ The convocation of the international conference was to be avoided because it would probably signify the end of the communist unity and the split in two blocs: one led by the Soviets and the other led by the Chinese. This was absolutely to be avoided in the eyes of Togliatti who really believed in the milestone of the communist unity. Indeed the break of the unity would put into question the reliability and the validity of the socialist principles.

The Soviets did not react in a good way to this Italian attitude of being accommodating and of being willing to compromise. It was perceived as an act of reaction to the Soviet line, almost a heresy. This mistrust soared up when the Italian Party explicitly called for a European conference, even though the Soviets had already expressed their negative answer.

Prior to addressing the evolution of the debate regarding the conference, it is worth recalling that at the beginning of 1964, two Italian delegations were sent respectively to Cuba and to Yugoslavia. It is interesting to note that Togliatti and Tito agreed upon many topics especially with regards to the concept of pacific coexistence and to the refusal of nuclear arms. They also planned of setting forth a common action in the Mediterranean area.¹³⁹

The fact that two delegations were independently sent abroad, namely without receiving the consent from the Soviets, shows how the Italian Party was trying to connect with other parties outside of the Soviet sphere.

¹³⁸ See: Alexander Hobel, *PCI e movimento comunista internazionale 1956-1964. Dal XX Congresso del PCUS al Memoriale di Yalta*, p. 38; S. Dalmasso, *Il caso Manifesto e il PCI degli anni 60*, Torino, cric editore, 1989, p. 12.

¹³⁹ For further info see: *Comunicato delle delegazioni dei Comitati Centrali del PCI e della LCJ sulle conversazioni svoltesi a Belgrado dal 15 al 21 gennaio 1964*, Belgrado, 21 gennaio 1964, in *Documenti Politici dal X...*, pp. 226-233.

The PCI strongly pushed for the convocation of a European Conference, perceived as the only way to avoid the break of the communist unity. This proposal was supported by the Yugoslavs. At this stage, Togliatti was in the first line in order to defend Tito against the attacks cast by the Chinese who did not appreciate the choices undertaken by the Yugoslav leader.

Thus the hated debate carried out by the Chinese against the Yugoslavs should be turned out. Their guilt namely to have innovated something both in the doctrine and in the practice of the fight for socialism is, at the end, an happy guilt, that we all should commit, [...] if we had to move forward [...].

*We have to get used to the idea that the international activity of the communist groups may be unfolded [...] in a way richer and more various than the past.*¹⁴⁰

Togliatti held that the Chinese were too extremists and dogmatic in their view of socialism. Indeed, this was the reason of discord between the two parties. However, it is important noting that, even though, there was a huge gap between these two parties, the Italian Communist Party really strived hard in order to avoid an open condemnation of the Chinese by the Soviets. This relied on the importance that the dialogue may fulfill in order to solve issues. In addition to this, *the unity in diversity* concept was open to accept even different ways of carrying out socialism without condemning it.

The Italian leader developed this concept even because he was well aware of the contradictions between the Soviet system and other socialist movements in the world.

What is crucial to take into consideration is that, overall, the Italian Communist Party was still in line with the Soviets regarding the merit of the question but not on the method chosen to handle it. This means that, even according to the PCI, the Chinese were too dogmatic and strict in their view of socialism. However, Togliatti was deeply convinced of the fact that an open disapproval was to be useless. Indeed, the Italian leaders thought that in order to face the Chinese

140 See: P. Togliatti, *Viaggio in Jugoslavia*, Rinascita, 1 February 1964.

question and to avoid an open rift was important to avoid a centralized direction of the movement. It was fundamental to avoid a repetition of the Comintern.¹⁴¹ This was a clear sign that time had changed and there was the need to guarantee more independence for all the communist parties.

4.4. Togliatti commenting on the Sino-Soviet debate

In regard to the apex reached by the Sino-Soviet debate, Togliatti argued that the Chinese position represented a stop and a refusal of further developing the Marxist theory. Indeed, he held that they were locked within a setting that was too dogmatic. He truly believed all the divergences could be overcome if there was the goal to reach common objectives. To this account, he was fiercely convinced of the importance and of the role that the working class movement in the capitalist countries could fulfill.

*This movement up to now has not fully carried out his function to free the colonial people [...]. The Chinese communist representatives [...] try to bring about a rift between the emancipation fight of all the people and that against capitalism in the countries most developed. This is a serious political mistake, that clashes with all our principles, but especially clashes against the current reality, because nowadays the roots of the people's slavery [...] have their foundation here, where there are the political and economic strongholds of imperialism [...]. This is a truth that we should translate in an organized action, in a real and concrete confrontation and backing between these two big features of the fight against imperialism.*¹⁴²

Togliatti was challenging the international communist movement to transform itself and to adapt the Marxist theory according to the situation in the capitalist countries. This point was the reason why, at the end, the Italian communist leader kept slightly leaning towards the Soviet side. The Chinese were perceived as too revolutionary and dogmatic, not aware of the European conditions of the working class.

141 For further info see: Carlo Spagnolo, *Sul Memoriale di Yalta*.

142 See: Palmiro Togliatti, *Memoriale di Yalta*.

4.5. Explaining the methodological reason of the divergence between the PCI and the CCP

Togliatti thought that the Chinese were against what could be considered a creative form of Marxism.¹⁴³ For this reason, they were blaming the Italian Party to behave like a heretic party leaning towards the capitalist side.

The Italian leader stressed the importance of analyzing the causes of the political mistakes carried out since the Stalin time and to avoid any tendency towards scission. He held that there was no need of dividing the fight carried out within the capitalist countries and that in the socialist ones. Indeed, he could not accept the Chinese statement that the fight of the communist parties within the capitalist countries was just another sort of imperialism.

*It means to be willing to break off solidarity, any chance of cooperation, a unity of aims and objectives. Instead there is room for a unitary fight, a fight against the great monopolistic power.*¹⁴⁴

Togliatti further argued that there was no need of establishing a precise program in order to eliminate the monopolistic and imperialist economy at the international level. It was fundamental to establish a systematic relationship between the movements fighting for the freedom of colonized countries and the western proletarian forces.¹⁴⁵ There was no contradiction in upholding this.

On this argument, it was sharp the divergence with the CCP. However, Togliatti kept pushing in order to avoid the convocation of an international conference because there was a high risk of expulsion of the Chinese Party. If that was to happen, the outcome was likely to be the establishment of authoritarian and sectarian systems within the communist world.

The Italian leader was deeply worried about the likely consequences that an open division would cause for the unity of the International Communist Movement. The only likely solution was to use the method of discussion and to ease the divergence thanks to a union of objectives.¹⁴⁶

4.6. The Italian delegation in Moscow

143 Ibid.

144 See note 140.

145 Ibid, p. 41.

In order to try to avoid the convocation of an international conference, an Italian delegation made up of Ingrao, Berlinguer and Colombis was sent to Moscow. The Soviets were inflexible and sturdy in their position. The Italian representatives deeply believed that *a conference without the Chinese would signify a scission and would make the Italian position more difficult to handle. We would find ourselves in front of a document that we are inevitably obligated to sign. However, we have to defend our autonomy.*¹⁴⁷

At the end, the majority of the representatives in Moscow agreed on the necessity of participating to the conference. This because an open refusal would endanger the Italian Party, and besides this, there would be the risk of the expulsion of the Italian party itself from the International Communist Movement.

The continual refusal to participate to the international conference, in the case in which it was hosted, stemmed from Galluzzi¹⁴⁸ and Alicata who believed that if the PCI was to participate, there would be no chance to influence the Soviets. Further, he argued that the Soviets were to take on responsibility for the wrong way through which they were handling the Chinese issue. This was dependent upon the wrong attitude and method through which they considered their relationship with the socialist countries.

However, the last word was given to Togliatti who, as usual acted as a mediator and expert politician. He reiterated the belonging of the PCI to the socialist camp and, at the same time, his autonomy.

It is evident that we are to participate to the preparatory commission. In the world there is the field of the communist parties, that is it. We cannot figure our party not belonging to this party. [...] In our field we allow diversity. Some documents may not be approved. We will not renounce

146 See: P. Togliatti, *Per l'unità del movimento operaio e comunista internazionale, report to the session of CC and CCC of PCI of 21-23 April 1964 in L'Unità.*

147 Extract from the report of the Italian delegation to Moscow.

148 Galluzzi was a member of the Italian Communist Party. Since 1976 he became a deputy of the European Parliament.

*our positions. [...] At the conference we will face the proposal of creating an international organism that we will not accept.*¹⁴⁹

Beyond the reaffirmation of the autonomy of the Italian Communist Party, Togliatti paid heed on the fact that their duty, in the case of a conference, was to highlight what were the new issues: the implementation of the decision taken during the XX Congress, the unity within the proletarian movement in countries such as Italy and France and the relationship with the socialist movements in the Third World.¹⁵⁰

It is sharp the different approach of the Italian communists towards the Chinese question in comparison to the French perspective. Indeed, Berlinguer after being present at the French Congress, when back in Italy underlined the extent of this divergence.¹⁵¹

What must be kept in mind is that at the beginning of the sixties it was evident that the relationship between the two major western communist powers, the French and the Italians were pretty tense. As previously stated, the French communist leaders did not appreciate the conciliatory attitude of the Italians towards the Chinese.¹⁵²

Throughout these years there was the willingness by the PCI to increase the number of international contacts with the communist parties from all over the world from Hungary, Romania to Norway, Morocco and many countries in America Latina where Renato Sandri was sent.¹⁵³ By means of this political activism, the Italian Communist Party was willing to counterbalance the centralization desired by the Soviets in order to get more autonomy within the international communist movement.¹⁵⁴

4.7. Deepening the explanation of the Italian flexible approach towards the Chinese

149 See note 140.

150 See: IG, APC, Direzione, 12-13 May 1964, mf. 028, pp. 608-629.

151 *Dichiarazione di Berlinguer di ritorno con la delegazione italiana dal Congresso del PCI*, l'Unità, 20 May 1964.

152 Lazar.

153 See: IG, APC, Segreteria, 26 May and 27 June 1964, mf.028, pp. 1479-1487 and 1540-1544.

154 Spagnolo.

Given that, at the end, the difference between the Italian and the Chinese Communist Parties was sharp and given that, the Italian leader was not to openly challenge the Soviet leadership, the question at stake is to understand why the party firmly pushed to adopt a flexible approach towards the Chinese. Would not have been more convenient for the Italians to accept the international conference and to be in line with the other European parties as the French one?

Indeed, the PCI, by adopting a flexible approach towards the Chinese question was seriously risking of damaging its relationship with the USSR that was to be protected as underlined a large amount of times by the leader Togliatti.

The core of this strategy, namely to be flexible towards the Chinese was well explained by the scholar Mammarella who pointed out the fact that *the legitimacy for the Chinese to sustain their own firm believes and their political line [...] was a means to defend the Italian path towards socialism*, recognizing to all the socialist parties *full freedom to theorize their own experiences*. In a nutshell, the Italian flexible approach towards the Chinese was a way to guarantee its own conception of *unity into diversity*.¹⁵⁵

However, given the impossibility to influence the Soviets, Togliatti still required the PCI representatives to participate to the conference announced by the Soviets. He explained his reasoning as follows:

*We must not give the impression that we do not understand the general needs of the movement. We face a centrifugal process that we are to handle. We have no interest that the prestige of the Soviet representative group is shaken by the international movement. We have no interest in bringing about new challenges for them. We will diminish our authority in front of them and our chance of action within the Conference. [...]. We must avoid our estrangement from the CPUS that would cause a serious situation.*¹⁵⁶

155 Ibid p. 43.

156 See note 140.

A minority within the group did not share the perspective of action set forth by Togliatti. Indeed, Ingrao¹⁵⁷ was deeply contrary to such proposal. He believed that by accepting the proposal of the Soviets to take part in the conference, the PCI would loose and change its position. Alicata endorsed Ingrao's point of view. At the end, Togliatti's proposal passed with just three contrary votes: Ingrao, Berlinguer and Natta.¹⁵⁸

4.8. The Yalta Memoir

The Soviets, following a meeting in July 1964 between Macaluso and Ponomarev, openly stated that one of the aim of the conference would be to reach a positive solution with the Chinese. They were not looking for a division within the international communist movement. They underlined how the missed participation of the Italian Communist Party would challenge and frustrate Soviet's plans, given that the Italian party was one of the biggest in the European area.

After this preliminary meeting, Togliatti was called to Moscow to encounter Khrushchev, but, at his arrival, the meeting did not take place. This deeply irritated the Italian leader.¹⁵⁹ Regarding this event, speculation has arisen on the reasons why Khrushchev was not present when Togliatti arrived. The reasons range from the fact that the Soviet leader did not want to meet Togliatti because of his proposal of having a European conference rather than an international one, to the fact that Khrushchev was too busy trying to handle all the divisions within the Soviet Party.

What is history is that the meeting could not happen since Togliatti was hit by a brain hemorrhage.¹⁶⁰ Prior to getting sick, Togliatti had started writing some considerations that would become known under the name of *Memoriale di Yalta*. An Italian delegation made up of Colombi, Alicata, Natta and Lama went to Crimea, given the precarious conditions of the Italian leader. Following his sudden death, Longo was appointed as his successor.¹⁶¹

157 Spagnolo.

158 IG, APC, Direzione, 2 July 1964, mf. 028, pp. 689-711.

159 See: IG, APC, Segreteria, 4 August 1964, mf. 028, pp. 1607-1609.

160 For further info see: A. Natta, *Le ore di Yalta*, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1970.

161 See: IG, APC, Direzione, 18 August 1964, mf. 028, pp. 755-774.

The *Memoriale di Yalta* encompasses some considerations over *the Italian way towards socialism* and it also contains a strong critique towards the Soviet Union. It is the first time that the Italian leader carried out such critique against the country he had always considered the milestone of international communism.

4.9 Preliminary conclusions

The most important focus of this chapter is the huge debate that divided the Italian Communist Party with regards to the convocation of a conference by the Soviets. The risk at stake was the break of the communist unity in the case of an open expulsion of the Chinese. Togliatti was worried that the international communist movement could have been divided in two parts. Thus, he did everything in his power in order to avoid it.

Furthermore, it is worth recalling that the flexible approach adopted by the Italian Communist Party towards the Chinese was a means to defend its own *way towards socialism* and the concept of *unity into diversity*. Indeed, if it is true that on the one hand, there was a huge division between the Italian and the Chinese parties on the way of understanding Marxism and its applicability, on the other, they were both challenging the leadership of the Soviet Union. For this reason, Togliatti tried his best not to arrive to an expulsion of the Chinese Party from the International Communist Movement.

This theory is not only supported by all the documents released by the *Istituto Gramsci* but also by all the statements released by Nilde Iotti and Boffa, the correspondent of the journal *L'unità* in Moscow.

The Yalta Memoir, the document that Togliatti was writing when he was in Crimea and that he could not finish because of the cerebral hemorrhage, was deeply critical toward the Soviet foreign policy and its way to handle the relationship with the Chinese. However, at the same time, it is worth mentioning that Togliatti has always reiterated the unquestionable trust in socialism and in the crucial role of the USSR. Maybe, at the end, this would prove to be his weak point, given that, the *Italian way towards socialism* did not take place as well as the proposal of strengthening the

euro communist parties in order to overcome the bipolar system. It is worth stating that many projects and proposals were stopped by Togliatti himself because of this unquestionable link towards the USSR that he could not get rid of.

CHAPTER V: THE PCI FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF THE BEST MAN

The main aim of the last chapter is to further elaborate on the Yalta memoir and its impact at the national and at the international level. It will further probe the shift of the Italian leadership following the death of Togliatti, *the best man*, and it will investigate the new approach of the Italian Communist Party towards both the USSR, the Chinese Communist Party and the project of the euro communism too.

5.1. International scenario

Following the death of Togliatti in 1964, there was an unstable situation, especially in the Third World, wherein a large amount of countries were fighting to reach independence. Their fight was deeply affected by the bipolar confrontation between the US and the URSS. However, these two big superpowers were undergoing a period of instability because of national issues.

Indeed, in the US, the death of Kennedy¹⁶² had brought about uncertainty over the chances to smooth the bipolar tension. In addition to this, the Vietnam War¹⁶³ angered the public opinion. On the other hand, in the USSR, Khrushchev was removed from office. That meant the end of the policy of peaceful coexistence and peace at the international level. Further, there was an internal struggle within the mains organizations of the USSR to wage the power for the leadership.

The change of leadership caused a crisis that showed all the structural problems within the Soviet Union. The Presidium tried to overcome this problem by allowing a limited sovereignty and by trying to lessen the controversy with Beijing. However, the outcome did not prevent the Soviet Union from channeling itself into a pattern that would have later on brought about its own dissolution.

¹⁶² For further info see: Robert Dallek, *An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917- '63*, Little, Brown and Company (April 13, 2003).

¹⁶³

5.2. The bequest of the Yalta memoir

Following the death of Togliatti, the communist group decided to publish his considerations.¹⁶⁴

It is worth mentioning that within his notes, he deeply took into account how to handle the Chinese question.¹⁶⁵ He did not want to condemn them on an ideological ground, even though the Chinese during the last Italian Congress had deeply attacked Togliatti's views. He thought the best solution to face the problem was to engage in multiple bilateral meeting and to avoid an international conference which was extremely likely to bring about a split within the international communist movement.

From the deep analysis that Togliatti carried out of the Chinese- Soviet debate, it is evident that, during these years, the Italian Communist Party wanted to play a major and more influencing role in the international arena. As previously stated, one of the main goal was to foster the euro communism, plan that unfortunately did not work out because of the division with the French Communist Party.

Togliatti was really worried: he wanted to avoid the split of the international communist movement at any cost. To avoid that, he was ready to compromise. Indeed, if the division were to happen, it would signify the dissolution of the major theoretical framework upon which his idea of socialism was built.¹⁶⁶ Even if he was quite critical of the method employed by the USSR to handle the Chinese, he held that the prestige of the USSR was still huge and enormous among the masses, given that it had been the first country that had undertaken the construction and the establishment of a socialist society. According to his understanding of socialism, conflict had to exist within the movement but a division was not acceptable because it would put into question all the general principles of the socialist doctrine.

164 See: IG, APC, Segreteria, 28 August 1964, mf. 028, pp. 1633-1634.

165 Spagnolo.

166 Ibid.

*It is not fair to state that among the socialist countries [...] everything always goes pretty well. [...] Indeed, difficulties, contradictions, new issues always spring up and they must be contextualize in relation to the effective reality. The worst thing to do is trying to sell the image that everything is always good, while we are randomly in front of challenging situations hard to explain and solve. [...] It is all dependent upon the issue of socialist economic and political development that in the Western world is little known.*¹⁶⁷

The core of his reasoning and ideas was enclosed in this statement:

*Maybe [...] we should not trust the enforced external uniformity. We should rather think that unity has to be established and maintained in the diversity and full autonomy of single countries.*¹⁶⁸

Thus, it can be strongly affirmed that the reasoning behind Togliatti's argument was also dependent upon the fact that he wanted to unhook the Italian Party from the Soviet aegis and to propose a new and creative role for the Western Communist Parties, perhaps under the Italian influence.¹⁶⁹

He was further probing the role of autonomy and *policentrismo* within the International Communist Movement as well as the fact that the establishment of socialism would be feasible within a State democratic structure.

*It rises up the question of conquering positions of power by the working class within a State structure whose nature is bourgeois. Thus, the question at stake is whether or not is feasible a fight for a continuous transformation of a State of this kind. In countries where the communist movement has become as strong as it is here (and in France), this is the fundamental matter that nowadays rises in the political fight.*¹⁷⁰

167 See: Spagnolo, *Sul Memoriale di Yalta*.

168 Ibid, p. 46.

169 See: Alexander Hobel, *PCI e movimento comunista internazionale 1956-1964 Dal XX Congresso del PCUS al Memoriale di Yalta*, p. 45-46.

170 Ibid.

Overall, he was consciously aware of the need of redefining the concept of progressive democracy and its link with socialism. In addition to this, he underlined the crucial role that Western Parties would undertake in order to push forward a renovation of the communist movement.¹⁷¹

At the international level, the publication of the memoir increased the Italian prestige. Indeed, his notes explained to all the other communist parties what constituted *the Italian path towards socialism* and what constituted the nexus between democracy and socialism.

5.3. The new internationalism

The memoir represented the first starting point towards the spread of a new internationalism whose roots can be traced back to 1956 when Togliatti first mentioned the importance of independence within the International Communist Movement.¹⁷² This new wave developed following the heated Sino-Soviet debate and it represented an alternative to the crisis that the internationalism represented by the Comintern had passed through.¹⁷³ This new internationalism was a concept built upon the idea of *policentrismo*, *peaceful coexistence* and socialism as an outgoing process, adapting itself to the changing circumstances.

It is undeniable the original and creative contribute given by the Italian Communist Party at this stage. However, even though, the Italian Communist Party intensified the number of international contacts, especially in the Middle East, it received harsh critics. For example, the Polish Party accused the Italians of bringing into question the foundations of the communist system itself.¹⁷⁴ In addition to this, the PCI was in contrast with the Arab Socialist Union over the State of Israel and over the nexus between socialism and democracy.

5.4. Longo's leadership

171 See: L. Longo, *Il promemoria di Yalta testamento politico di Togliatti*.

172 Spagnolo.

173 Nicolosi.

174 See: Galeazzi, *Togliatti and Tito*, pp. 262-263.

Longo was appointed as general secretary of the Italian Communist Party following Togliatti's death. It must be pointed out that Longo had always been a fervent antifascist, fighting harshly against the occupation. When Italy was freed during the Second World War, he was pushing for the establishment of a working class assembly. He stood by Togliatti's side since the real beginning. However, the two had a quite different approach towards socialism. Togliatti had always preferred the parliamentary path, trying to act within an institutional framework and respecting the democratic rules. On the other hand, Longo had always pushed for the working class mobilization. He was way more radical, even though, as the years passed by, he started following more Togliatti's path.

When he was elected general secretary of the PCI, following the death of *the best man*, his first decision was to make public the *Yalta Memoir*¹⁷⁵. He followed Togliatti's line, trying to spread the concept of *policentrismo* and the autonomy from the Soviet Union. At the same time, he did not abandon the project on the Euro Communism, on the contrary he encouraged the European integration.

5.4.1. The relationship with the Chinese

Even though the Sino-Soviet debate was unwinding, within the PCI there were opposing views. On the one hand, Pajetta denounced the anti Soviet action carried out by the Chinese. On the other one, Berlinguer held that the USSR was wrong in not recognizing the People's Republic of China as a great power. Other reasons of debate regarded the atomic bomb. Sereni pointed out that *it was positive that a big, socialist and anti capitalist country ended up having atomic bombs*. However, his point of view was not shared by the majority of the group. Furthermore, both Ingrao and Berlinguer argued that a cause of discord with China was the proposal of a socialist democracy.¹⁷⁶

175 See: Galluzzi, *La Svolta*, pp. 5-36.

176 See: APC, Direzione, 6 November 1964, mf 28.

In November 1964, there was a meeting between Longo and a Chinese delegation for the peace movement.¹⁷⁷ The main outcome was a long discussion on the Italian proposal of *autonomous paths towards socialism*. The Italian leader underlined how the Chinese were to understand it, given their peculiar way of establishing socialism according to the Chinese characteristics. However, at the same time, all the reasons of discord between the two parties were analyzed. Firstly, the Italians claimed unfair the accusations of being reformist. Secondly, they held they did not share the same view as the Chinese on war and on peace. At last, it was evident to all the international community that the quarrel between China and the USSR had slowed the revolutionary fight worldwide.

5.4.2. The international contacts of the PCI

In 1964, an Italian delegation took part to the II International Conference of the Non-alignment countries at Il Cairo. The comment of the delegation attending was fairly positive, given that the countries pushed for a more active role in the bipolar confrontation and they discussed about the establishment of a new international economic order.

This is just one example of the institutional contacts that the PCI was trying to establish during the sixties. This new wake was due to the fact that the Italian government was run by a center left coalition and due to the transformation of the catholic world.¹⁷⁸ At this time, the PCI became the *trait d'union* with the new international actors, especially with the Asian, African and Middle East countries. It helped to develop the foreign affairs Italian policy.

Throughout 1965, the PCI kept increasing the number of contacts with other communist movements in order to ward off any crisis of the movement.

5.4.3. The PCI and Moscow

In January 1965, Berlinguer went to Moscow in order to retie the relationship with the USSR. The point at stake of the meeting was to suggest the Soviets to encompass all the parties

¹⁷⁷ See: APC, Estero, China, mf 520, pp. 616, 619.

¹⁷⁸ For further info see: Y. Voulgaris, *L'Italia del centro sinistra (1960-1968)*.

during the international conferences, especially the ones from Asia.¹⁷⁹ Berlinguer was deeply aware of the delicate international situation, characterized by multiple crisis within international institutions such as the UN, but also among many communist countries. The last discord that arose was the one between Cuba and the People's Republic of China.¹⁸⁰

Berlinguer put himself in line with Togliatti's legacy. He truly believed in the irrevocable unity of the movement. Thus, the Chinese could not be expunged. Furthermore, he was against dogmatism perceived as a brake towards political activism. The novelty was that he paid heed on the economic development issue and on the development and further strategies of the world revolutionary movement. The autonomy was undeniable because it was the condition whereby fostering the movement.

5.4.4. The PCI towards the Vietnam question

The Vietnam War soon became reason of discord between the USSR and China. In 1965 an Italian delegation was sent to Ho Chi Minh via Moscow and Beijing with the purpose of better analyzing and understanding the situation. The delegation was made up of Pajetta, Colajonni, Natoli, Sarri and Occhetto.¹⁸¹ The Chinese refused to cooperate with the Soviets. According to the Italians, it was their strategy to push for a direct confrontation between the USSR and the US.¹⁸²

At this stage, the Italian Communist Party was trying to balance the tension between the two superpowers mainly in order to protect its own autonomy and in order to push for a more international role.

5.5. Berlinguer and its different approach

Prior to briefly mentioning all the changes carried on by this charismatic leader, it is worth mentioning his background. Berlinguer joined the Italian Communist Party very young at the age of 20. Since the beginning, he took on important positions and he always acted as a mediator between

¹⁷⁹ See: APC, Direzione, 12 February 1965, mf. 28, pp. 570.

¹⁸⁰ See: Pappagallo, *Il PCI e la rivoluzione cubana* and APC, Direzione, 8 March 1965, mf. 29, p. 610.

¹⁸¹ See: APC, Estero, 1965, mf.528, p. 1050-1053.

¹⁸² See: APC, Direzione, 11 May 1965, mf. 29, p. 715.

the old representatives: Di Vittorio, Amendola, Scoccimarro and Pajetta and the new generation of communist leaders: Cossutta, Macaluso and Barca. Following the death of Togliatti in 1964 and the following internal dispute to name the successor, Berlinguer acted both as a mediator and as a bashful and shy comrade. Between 1966 and 1968 he gained many international experiences thanks to his trips to Vietnam, China, North Korea and Mosca.

He was appointed leader of the Italian Communist Party in 1972, even though, he had backed up Long since the very beginning and since 1968 as vice secretary of the Italian Communist Party. His appointment brought about a big shift in the approach of the Italian Communist Party towards the Soviets. Indeed, it is worth mentioning that during international communist conference held in Moscow in 1968, he refused to sign the final report. He stood against the expulsion of the Chinese and he pinpointed to the leader Leonid Breznev how the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had deepened the already existent divergences within the communist movement on topics such as national sovereignty, socialist democracy and cultural freedom.¹⁸³ Indeed, during the Prague spring, the Italian Communist Party stood by the side of Alexander Dubcek.

He really wanted to separate the Italian communism from the Soviet one. Since the very beginning of the 60's he became the most courageous supporter of the euro communism.

He wanted to break the link of dependence with the USSR and was willing to forge new alliances with Asian forces, first among all the Chinese. Under the influence of Berlinguer, the Italian Communist Party started looking at the Asian parties and especially the Chinese one with different eyes, willing to forge a further cooperation, not only in order to overcome the Soviet influence.

5. 6 Preliminary conclusions

In this chapter, I briefly probed the shift of leadership within the Italian Communist Party and its own new attitude towards the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party. Prior of

¹⁸³ For further info see: Francesco Barbagallo, *Enrico Berlinguer*; Giorgio Galli et al., *Così in Berlinguer, un'idea*, Mondadori.

drawing a conclusion over the relationship between the Italian and Chinese parties, it is worth recalling one of the main event that took place in China while in Italy the communist party was run by Longo.

By the beginning of June 1966, the Great Cultural Revolution became a mass movement whose main goal was to get rid of all the authorities considered bourgeois and reactionary. The need was to attack all the people that had lost the real truth embracing the capitalist via and its ideology. According to Mao ZeDong thinking¹⁸⁴, this revolution had to be carried out by the peasants and workers that, at that time, represented roughly 90% of the population.

In addition to this, intellectuals and students had to support the peasants trying to develop and adopt the concept of intellectual proletarian. Finally, a systematic critique against the reactionary ideology had to be unrelentingly upheld.

Throughout 1966, China improved really fast in many fields such as science, technology and industry and agriculture. At the door of 1967, China was heading towards the Cultural Revolution, a choice that would have brought about harsh consequences both for the rulers and the population.

*The Great Cultural Proletarian Revolution currently underway is a revolution that moves the people's conscience and it represents a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution in our country, a strength wider and deeper.*¹⁸⁵

It is worth analyzing the reactions that the Cultural Revolution brought about in other socialist countries. It was deeply appreciated in Senegal and Pakistan.

The Soviet revisionists try to set forth world domination together with the American Imperialism. However, the international unitary coalition whose avant-guard is the Chinese people

184 *The masses grab as a weapon Mao's thinking [...] in order to differentiate what is right from what is wrong.*

185 Extract from the decision of the CC of the CCP on the great cultural proletarian revolution.

*supplied with Mao's thinking will surely defeat the modern revisionism and the American imperialism.*¹⁸⁶

*The Chinese revolution is the biggest event in history of humanity.*¹⁸⁷

On the other hand, in Italy, at the real beginning, the Cultural Revolution was deeply appreciated by the communists, especially what constituted its philosophy. It helped overcoming the debate that happened between the two parties in the previous years. However, it is worth recalling that, because of the harsh consequences the Cultural Revolution brought about, all the communist parties became aware of the mistakes that had been made.

Overall, it can be affirmed that the Italian Communist Party since the fifties had always looked at the Chinese for mainly two reasons. First, because its main leaders were already aware of the fact that the People's Republic of China was to become an international player. Secondly, because defending some of the Chinese positions, was a means to defend its own *path towards autonomy* from the aegis of the Soviet Union.

¹⁸⁶ Extract from agenzia Hsinhua di Pechino, APCI MFF 0539 2510.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, quote by Robert Williams, prerepresentative of the black movement in the USA.

CONCLUSION

This work tried to set forth a new perspective regarding the Italian Communist Party and its relationship with the extra European parties.

Even though the USSR has always played a big influence on the PCI, it is interesting to note that especially following the 1964, the PCI tried to develop its own ties with other parties, in particular the Asian ones.

Since the crucial facts that happened in 1956 among which the Hungarian crisis, it was evident that the PCI was trying to differentiate itself from the Soviet line. It is important to note the harsh debate that the Italians had with the Chinese counterpart over many fundamental aspects of the socialist doctrine. Indeed, because of the Italian proposal of *policentrismo*, the Chinese blamed the Italians to have abandoned the traditional Marxist view of socialism. Despite this heated debate, the Italian Communist Party was the only European party that stood in favor of the Chinese, trying to avoid their expulsion from the International Communist Movement. This reason relied more on the fact the Italian leader, Togliatti, *the best man*, wanted to avoid the split of the International Communist Movement. However, it is worth mentioning that defending the Chinese was a means by which the Italian Communist Party could defend its own autonomy.

Following the death of Togliatti, Longo and then Berlinguer tried to further differentiate the Italian Communist Party from the USSR and to forge more alliances with the Asian communist parties.

Thanks to the efforts of the Italian communists in establishing relationship with the Chinese counterpart, in 1971 there will be the establishment of official diplomatic relationship between the two countries.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis could not have been written without the dedicated assistance of professors and friends who supported me throughout the whole process of research and writing.

Prof. Lin Minwang was indispensable. As my supervisor he supported me in the choice I made and he supported me while in the process of writing the thesis.

It has been my good fortune to have Chloe Boulanger as my flat mate this year in Beijing. She has always supported me in any choice I made. Further, I want to thank all the friends and colleagues that I met this year at China Foreign Affairs University.

To all these people I am immensely grateful.

Needless to say, any shortcoming in the thesis is my own.

As always over almost all my life, my mother, Paola, provided her staunch moral and intellectual support amidst the solitude I generate around myself when writing. I have dedicated this thesis to her who always stands by my side.

REFERENCES

Primary Sources

Archivi

APC, Comitato Centrale, session of 10-11 November 1961, mf 025, pp. 312-330.

APCI, Direzione, MF 26.

APCI, Direzione, MF198, march 16th 1956.

APCI, MF 0539 2510.

APCI, Fondo Mosca, Direzione, MF 24, PP.692 ss.

APCI, Fondo Mosca, Direzione, MF 198, B. 328.

IG, APC, Direzione, 17-18 November 1961, mf.025, pp. 1660-1692.

IG, APC, Direzione, 7 December 1961, mf.025, pp. 1693-1718.

IG, APC, Segreteria, 24 January 1962, mf. 026, pp. 650-652.

IG, APC, Segreteria, 11 January 1963.

IG, APC, Segreteria, 5 February 1963, mf. 027, pp. 278-302.

IG, APC, Direzione, 13 and 21 February 1963, mf. 027, pp. 303-318 and 319-331.

IG, APC, Segreteria, 3 April and 14 May 1963, mf. 027, pp. 713-714 and 721-729.

IG, APC, Segreteria, 29 May and 28 June 1963, mf. 027, pp. 740-742 and 781-789.

IG, APC, Direzione, 12 September and 11 October 1963.

IG, APC, Segreteria, 24 April 1964, mf. 028, pp. 608-629.

IG, APC, Segreteria, 26 May and 27 June 1964, mf. 028, pp. 1479-1487 and 1540-1544.

IG, APC, Direzione, 2 July 1964, mf. 028, pp.689-711.

IG, APC, Segreteria, 4 August 1964, mf. 028, pp. 1607-1609.

IG, APC, Direzione, 18 August 1964, mf. 028, pp. 755-774.

IG, APC, Segreteria, 28 August 1964, mf. 028, pp. 1633-1634.

APC, Direzione, 6 November 1964, mf. 28.

APC, Estero, Cina, mf. 520, pp. 616/619.

APC, Direzione, 8 March 1965, mf. 29 p. 610.

APC, Estero, 1965, mf. 528, p. 1050-1053.

APC, Direzione, 11 May 1965, mf. 29, p.715.

Prezidium, I, doc. 34, pp. 106-7.

Prezidium, I, doc. 101, pp. 224, 991.

Prezidium, I, docc. 137, 138, 139, pp. 279-81, 1022.

Prezidium II, doc. 138, pp. 720-30.

Journals

Dichiarazione di Berlinguer di ritorno con la delegazione italiana dal Congresso del PCI, l'Unità, 20 May 1964.

Il dibattito al CC sul XXII Congresso del PCUS, in L'Unità, 12 novembre 1961.

P. Togliatti, *Per una soluzione negoziata del problema di Berlino*, in L'Unità, 28 settembre 1961.

P. Togliatti, *Avanti, verso il comunismo, liberandosi dalle scorie del passato*, report to the session of CC and CCC of 10-13 November 1961, in L'Unità, 11 November 1961.

P.Togliatti, *Contro il dogmatism, per una politica marxista*, Rinascita, 31 August 1963.

P. Togliatti, *Per l'unità del movimento operaio e comunista internazionale*, L'Unità, 21-23 April 1964.

P. Togliatti, *Riconduciamo la discussion ai suoi termini reali*, Rinascita, 12 January 1963.
L'Unità, 12 December 1961

P. Togliatti, *Una sfida che accettiamo*, Rinascita, 11 April 1964.

P. Togliatti, *Viaggio in Jugoslavia*, Rinascita, 1 febbraio 1964.

Le divergenze tra il compagno Togliatti e noi, Rinascita, 12 January 1963.

Secondary Sources

Books

Alfonso Alfonsi, *Aldo Moro nella Dimensione Internazionale, Dalla Memoria alla Storia*. Storia internazionale dell'età contemporanea.

A. Natta, *Le ore di Yalta*, Roma, Editori Riuniti (1970).

B. Schoch, *Die International Politik der italienischen Kommunisten*, Campus, Frankfurt am Main (1988).

Carola Stern, *Ulbricht: a political biography*, Pall Mall Press (1965).

Carlo Spagnolo, *Sul Memoriale di Yalta: Togliatti e la crisi del movimento comunista internazionale (1956-1964)*, Carocci (2007).

Marco Galeazzi, *Il PCI e il Movimento dei Paesi Non-Allineati 1955-1975*, Storia internazionale dell'età contemporanea.

Morris, William E. (August 2001). Lettis, Richard, ed. *The Hungarian Revolt: 23 October–4 November 1956* (Reprint ed.). Simon Publications.

Fernando Claudin, *Communist Movement : from Comintern to Cominform*, Monthly Review Pr (1977).

Francesco Barbagallo, *Enrico Berlinguer*, Roma, Carocci (2006).

Franzosi Roberto, *The Puzzle of Strikes: Class and State, Strategies in Postwar Italy*, Cambridge University Press (1995).

G. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Pearson P T R (1999).

G. Fiori, *Vita di Enrico Berlinguer*, L'Unità, Laterza (1992).

Giancarlo Pajetta, *Il Ragazzo Rosso Va alla Guerra*, Mondadori; Prima Edizione (1986).

Giorgio Bocca, *Togliatti*, Feltrinelli (2014).

Giorgio Galli et al., *Così in Berlinguer, un'idea*, Mondadori (1984).

Giovanni Spadonoli, *Nenni sul filo della memoria (1949-1989)*, Le Monnier (1982).

Guido Liguori, *Berlinguer Rivoluzionario. Il pensiero politico di un comunista rivoluzionario*, Carocci (2014).

J. Guillermaz, *Storia del Partito Comunista Cinese*.

L. Gruppi, *Togliatti e la via italiana al socialismo*.

Luciano Radi, *La DC da De Gasperi a Fanfani*, Soveria Manelli, Rubbettino (2005).

Maria Luisi Righi, *Il PCI e lo stalinismo*, Editori Riuniti (2007).

M. Flores, *1956*, Il Mulino, Bologna (1996).

M.L.Righi, *Quel terribile '56. I verbali della direzione comunista tra il XX Congresso del Pcus e l'VIII Congresso del Pci*, Editori Riuniti, Roma (1996).

Nicolas Werth, *Storia della Russia del Novecento*, Il Mulino, Bologna (2000).

Pappagallo, *Il PCI e la rivoluzione cubana*.

Pietro Di Loreto, *Alle origini della crisi del PCI: Togliatti e il legame di ferro*, Roma, EUROMA (1988).

Pietro Di Loreto, *Togliatti e la doppiezza: il PCI tra democrazia e insurrezione, 1944-1949*. Bologna, Il Mulino, (1991).

Richard West, *Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia*, Faber Find (2012).

Robert Dallak, *An Unfinished Life : John F. Kennedy, 1917-'63*, BackBay Books (2004).

S. Dalmasso, *Il caso Manifesto e il PCI degli anni 60*, Torino cric editore (1989).

S. Sassoon, *Togliatti e la via italiana al socialismo. Il PCI dal 1944 al 1964*, Einaudi (1980).

Silvio Pons, *La Rivoluzione Globale: Storia del Comunismo Internazionale 1917-199*, Einaudi (2012).

TH. P. Bernstein and H.-Y.LI, *China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present*, Lexington Books, Lanham (2010).

Tokes, Rudolf L., *Hungary's Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession*, Cambridge University Press (1998).

Vladislov M Zubok, *A Failed Empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (The New Cold War History), the University of North Carolina Press (2009).

Y. Voulgaris, *L'Italia del centro sinistra (1960-1968)*, Carocci, Roma, (1998).

Miscellaneous

Alexander Hobel, *PCI e movimento comunista internazionale 1956-1964. Dal XX Congresso del PCUS al Memoriale di Yalta*.

C. Bèkès, *East Central Europe, 1953-1956*, in M.P. Leffler and O. A. Westad, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. I.

Comunicato delle delegazioni dei Comitati Centrali del PCI e della LCJ svoltosi a Belgrado (15-21 gennaio 1964), 4 febbraio 1964 in *Documenti Politici dal X...*

Donald S. Zagoria, *The 1957 Moscow Conference and the Sino-Soviet Dispute*, School of Oriental and African Studies.

E. Berlinguer, *Maturi il movimento politico generale per la svolta a sinistra*, report to the session of the CC and CCC of PCI of 20-23 December 1961, in *L'Unità*, 21 December 1961, in E. Berlinguer, P. Togliatti, *La forza, lo sviluppo e I compiti del PCI nel momento presente*, Roma, 1962, pp. 3-70.

G.C. Pajetta, *Problemi del movimento comunista internazionale*, report to the session of CC of PCI of 25-26 July 1963, *l'Unità*, 27 July 1963.

J. Guillermez, *Storia del Partito Comunista cinese. II. Il Partito Comunista al Poter (1 ottobre 1949-1 marzo 1972)*.

J. Haslam, *I dilemmi della destalinizzazione. Togliatti, il XX Congresso del Pcus e le sue conseguenze*, in R. Gualtieri, C. Spagnolo e E. Taviani, *Togliatti nel suo tempo*, Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Annali, XV, Carocci, Roma 2007.

L. Longo, *Il promemoria di Yalta testamento politico di Togliatti*.

M. Schoenthals, *Mao Zedong. Speeches at the 1957 Conference*, in the *Journal of Communist Studies*, II (1986), n.2.

P. Togliatti, *Avanti verso il comunismo. Liberandosi delle scorie del passato. Rapporto al CC e al CCC sul XXII Congresso del PCUS, Roma, 10-11 novembre, GATE, Roma 1961*.

P. Togliatti, *La via italiana al socialismo*, report of the CC of the PCI, 24 June 1956.

P. Togliatti, *Una strategia mondiale*, *Rinascita*, 15 December 1962, in *Togliatti e il centrosinistra...*, vol. II, pp. 172-173.

P. Togliatti, *Verso il X Congresso del Partito*, intervention to the session of CC of 26-28 of April, *l'Unità*, 28 April 1962, in *Togliatti e il centrosinistra*, vol. II, pp. 1085-1100.

R. Martinelli, *Togliatti, lo stalinismo e il XXII Congresso del PCUS. Un discorso ritrovato*, in *Italia Contemporanea*, 219, giugno 2000.

Stefano De Luca, *Il XXII Congresso del PCUS : la destalinizzazione tra Liberman e Solzenicyn*, *Instoria* (2006).

S. Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, vol. III. *Statesman* (1953-1964), the Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park 2007, pp. 420-25, 727-44.

X Congresso del Partito comunista italiano. Atti e Risoluzioni, Roma, 1963.

Zh. Shen and Ya. Xia, *Hidden Currents During the Honeymoon. Mao, Khrushchev, and the 1957 Moscow Conference*, in *Journal of Cold War Studies*, XI (Autumn 2009), n. 4.